Prosecuting and District Attorneys by Bates, Henry M.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1909 
Prosecuting and District Attorneys 
Henry M. Bates 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/147 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Jurisdiction 
Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the State and 
Local Government Law Commons 
CYCLOPEDIA
OF
LAW AND PROCEDURE
WILLIAM MACK, LL.D
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
VOLUME XXXII
NEW YORK
THE AMERICAN LAW BOOK COMPANY
LONDON: BUTTERWORTH & CO., u Bull Yard
1909
Copyright, 1909
By The American Law Book Company
J. B. LYON COMPANY
PRINTRRS AND BINDERS
ALBANY, N. Y.
PROSECUTING AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
By Henry M. Bates
Professor of Law, Department of Law, University of Michigan*
I. Nature and Functions of Office, 689
II. Election or Appointment, Qualification, Tenure, Etc., 690
A. Election or Appointment, 690
1. In General, 690
2. Appointment to Fill Vacancy, 690
B. Eligibility, 690
1. In General, 690
2. Women, 691
3. How Determined, 691
C. Qualification, 691
1. In General, 691
2. Refusal of Court to Allow Qualification, 692
D. Tenure, 692
1. In General, 692
2. Of Appointee to Fill Vacancy, 692
E. Removal and Resignation, 693
1. Removal, 693
a. In General, 693
b. Method, 694
c. Practice, 694
2. Resignation, 694
F. Effect of Redividing Stale Into Judicial Districts, 695
III. COMPENSATION AND FEES, 695
A. Of State Prosecuting and District Attorneys, 695
1. In General, 695
2. In Criminal Prosecutions, 698
a. In General, 698
b. Indictment and Trial Fees, 698
c. Upon Termination of Prosecution, 698
d. Several Defendants, 699
e. Several Counts, 699
3. Civil Actions and Proceedings, 699
4. Deductions, 700
5. Commissions on Fines and Collections, 700
6. Expenses, 701
7. Additional Compensation and Extra Allowance, 702
a. In General, 702
b. By Contract, 703
c. Fees in Addition to Salary, 704
8. Liability of State, County, City, and Private Citizens, 704
9. Allowance and Collection, 705
a. Allowance, 705
b. Collection, 706
c. Li'erc or Charge on Fund or Judgment, 706
• Compiler and editor of " A Selection of Cases on the Law of Wills."
687
688 [32 Cyc] PROSECOTINQ AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
10. Conflicting Claims, 707
a. Between Incumbent and Predecessor, 707
b. Between Superior and Inferior Officers, 707
c. Between Incumbent De Facto and Rightful Officer, 707
B. Of United States District Attorneys, 708
1. Salary, 708
2. Expenses, 708
3. Extra Allowance, 709
4. Allowance and Collection, 709
5. Demand or Receipt of Other Compensation, 709
IV. Powers and Duties, 710
A- Representation of United States, State, or County, 710
1. United States, 710
2. State and County, 710
a. In General, 710
b. Contracts and Expenses, 713
B. Coiiduct of Criminal Proceedings, 713
G. Prosecution and Defense of Civil Actions and Proceedings, 715
D. Outside of County or District, 717
V. LIABILITIES, 717
A. Civil Liability, 717
B. Criminal Responsibility, 718
VI. DEPUTIES, ASSISTANTS, AND SUBSTITUTES, 718
A. Appointment, 718
1. In General, 718
2. By the Court, 719
3. By Governor, Attorney-General, Prosecuting Attorney, or Assistant
County Board, Etc., 721
4. Upon Change of Venue, 722
5. Presumption and Record, 722
B. Eligibility, 722
C. Qualification, 723
D. Tenure, 723
E. Powers and Duties, 724
F. Compensation and Fees, 724
1. In General, 724
2. Division of Fees, 725
3. Allowance and Collection, 726
4. Upon Change of Venue, 727
5. Assistants to United States District Attorneys, 727
CROSS-REFERENCES
For Matters Relating to:
Argument and Conduct in Criminal Cases, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 519,
535.
Attorney-General, see Attorney-General, 4 Cyc. 1024.
Corporation or City Attorneys, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 584.
Grand Jury, see Grand Juries, 20 Cyc. 1338.
Indictment or Information, see Indictments and Informations, 22 Cyc.
203.
Mandamus, see Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 200.
Quo Warranto, see Quo Warranto.
For General Matters Relating to Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, see
Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 70.
PROSECUTING AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS [32 Oyo.] 689
I. Nature and functions of Office.
Prosecuting and district attorneys are judicial officers of the state,1 within
their respective districts, although not officers of the state at large.2 Under some
statutes they are county officers,3 while under others they are not, but are circuit
or district officers.4 The state may provide as many as are necessary to
prosecute criminals and otherwise protect its interests,5 subject of course to
constitutional restrictions; 8 and where the office is not created by the con
stitution, but by statute, it may bo abolished or changed by the legislature.7
Like other attorneys, prosecuting and district attorneys are officers of the
court; 8 but they are not a part of the court because of their office. A prosecut
ing attorney is a public officer because he represents the sovereign power of the
people of the state by whose authority and in whose name, under the consti
tution, all prosecutions must be conducted, and not because of his relation to
the court.*
1. Griffith p. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44
N. E. 1001; State i'. Helming, 33 Ind. 189;
Fellows i!. New York, 8 Hun (X. Y.) 484,
And see State v. Lucas County, 28 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 170.
State office.— The office of prosecuting at
torney is a state office within Ark. Const, art.
19, § 23, limiting the amount of compensation
of officers of the state. Griffin v. Rhoton, 85
Ark. 89, 107 S. W. 380.
2. Ex p. Wiley, 54 Ala. 226; State v.
Tucker, 46 Ind. 355.
An act authorizing employment of a prose
cuting attorney for an inferior court, at the
option of the judge, does not create a state
office; but such attorney, when employed, is
for the time a state officer. Tesh v. Com., 4
Dana (Ky.) 522.
3. State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 29, 3 So. 433;
People v. Williams, 232 III. 519, 83 N. E.
H147; Cook County v. Healy, 222 111. 310,
78 N. E. 623; Clark v. Tracy, 95 Iowa 410,
64 N. W. 290; State v. Kovblosky, 92 Iowa
498, 61 N. W. 223; Nothstein v. Carbon
County, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 206.
In Washington the office of prosecuting at
torney created by the act of Feb. 3, 1891, is
identical with that of county attorney exist
ing before the passage of that act. Spokane
County t>.Allen, 9 Wash. 229, 37 Pac. 428, 43
Am. St. Rep. 830.
County attorneys are "municipal officers"
within the meaning of 111. Const, art. 9, § 11,
providing that the fees, salary, or compen
sation of no municipal officer shall be changed
during his term. People v. Williams, 232 111.
519, 83 N. E. 1047..
4. Merwin v. Boulder County, 29 Colo. 169,
67 Pac. 285; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355.
6. Tt may provide one for each county or
for certain counties only (Ex p. Lusk, 82 Ala.
519, 2 So. 140), or separate officers within
the same district, one representing the state
in superior courts, and the other in inferior
courts (Dodd v. Sweetser. 14 Ind. 292).
6. Fleming v. Hance. 153 Cal. 162, 94 Pac.
620, holding that Cal. St. (1901) p. 95, c. 81,
as amended by St. (1907) p. 850, c. 465, pro
viding for the appointment of prosecuting at-
torneys for police courts, and making *.
t
the
duty of such prosecuting attorneys to attend
the sessions of the police courts and conduct
all prosecutions for public offenses, conflicts-
with Const, art. 11, § 5
,
requiring the legisla
ture to provide by general laws for election
or appointment of district attorneys and to
prescribe their duties, Pol. Code, § 4256
(County Government Act (1897), p. 488,
c. 277, § 132), making it the duty of district
attorneys to '." conduct on behalf of the people
all prosecutions for public offenses," and St.
(1889) p
. 472, c. 1
,
§ 49, making it the duty
of a city attorney to prosecute all criminal
cases arising upon violations of the charter or
ordinances, and Const, art. 11, § 6
,
exempting
charters from legislative control in municipal
affairs; and is invalid in so far as it im
poses on the city the duty of paying the
salary of prosecuting attorneys for prosecut
ing offenses either under the statute gener
ally or under the charter or ordinances; and
its invalidity is not affected by St. (1901)
p. 96, c. 81, "providing that the fines imposed
by the police courts shall be paid into the
city treasury.
7. Dinsmore v. State, 61 Nebr. 418, 85 N. W.
445, holding that the office of district attor
ney was not created by the constitution, but
by" general law before the adoption of the con
stitution, and that the legislature has consti
tutionally abolished it and created the office
of county attorney instead.
8. In re Leaken, 137 Fed. 680: Fifth Nat.
Bank v. Long, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,780, 7 Biss.
502, holding, however, that a United States
district attorney is not so far an officer of the
United States court that it can compel him
to enter the appearance of the government
in a case.
Assistant district attorneys appointed by a.
United States district judge, as authorized
by Act Cong. May 28. 1896, c. 252, § 8 (29
U. S. St. at L. 181 [U. S. Comp. St. (1901)
p. 613]), are officers of the United States
courts for their respective districts. In re
Leaken, 137 Fed. 680.
9. Fleming v. Hance, 153 Cal. 162, 94 Pac.
620.
[44] [I]
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II. ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION, TENURE, ETC.
A. Election or Appointment 10— 1. In General. *The manner of appoint
ment or election of prosecuting and district attorneys in the state depends entirely
upon the constitution and laws of the several states." District attorneys of the
United States are appointed by the president by and with the advice ar.d consent
of the cenate.13 If no other mode of filling the office is provided by law, any court
having criminal jurisdiction has the power to appoint an attorney to prosecute.15
2. Appointment to Fill Vacancy.14 Vacancies in the office of prosecuting or
district attorney are usually filled by the executive, by the circuit, district, or
county courts, or by a county board, the power and mode of appointment being
provided by statute.1"' Power to appoint a district attorney pro tempore, in the
absence of the regular incumbent, has been held to include the power to fill a
vacancy.18 A statute creating the office of county attorney and providing for
vacancies therein will prevail over general laws as to the manner of filling vacan
cies,17 unless the general law is contained in a new constitution.18 Since a district
attorney duly appointed or elected holds until his successor is qualified,19 if one
duly elected or appointed fails to qualify and enter upon the duties of the office,
or dies or resigns before qualifying, there is no vacancy, but his predecessor holds
over until the next election,20 except where the predecessor's term is limited
expressly by the constitution or statute.21 Where, however, a duly qualified
prosecuting attorney-elect resigns or dies, although Ids predecessor's term has not
yet expired, the latter cannot hold over, but a vacancy is created.2* An unauthor
ized resignation does not create a vacancy.23
B. Eligibility21— 1. In General. In some jurisdictions it has been held that,
unless expressly required by the constitution or statute, a license to practise law is not
necessary to render one eligible to the office of prosecuting or district attorney; 25
10. Of deputies, assistants, and substitutes
see infra, VI, A.
11. See Ex p. Lusk, 82 Ala. 519, 2 So. 140;
People v. Brown, 16 Cal. 441 ; State v. Tucker,
46 Ind. 355; State v. Saline County, 60 Xebr.
275, 83 N. W. 70 (elections only in even-num
bered vears) ; People v. Albany C. PI., 19
Wend."(N. Y.) 27.
Election generally see Elections, 15 Cvc.
268.
12. U. S. Const, art. 2, § 2; U. S. Rev. St.
(1878) § 767 [U. S. Comp. St. (1901)
p. 599]. And see Parsons v. U. S., 167 U. S.
324, 17 S. Ct. 880, 42 L. ed. 185.
13. Tesh v. Com., 4 Dana (Ky.) 522.
14. Tenure of appointee to fill vacancy see
infra, II, D, 2.
15. See the statutes of the several states.
And see People r. Brown, 16 Cal. 441; State
v. Davis. 44 Mo. 129.
Appointment by a county board is suffi
ciently attested by entry upon the records of
the board, the statute not prescribing the
manner in which such appointments shall be
made. State r. Walker, 30 Nebr. 501, 46
X. W. 648.
United States district attorneys.— U. S.
Rev. St. 11878) g 793 IT. 8. Comp. St.
(1901) p. 610], providing that, "in case of a
vacancy in the office of the district attorney
or marshal within any circuit, the circuit
Justice of such circuit mav fill the same, and
the person appointed by him shall serve until
an appointment is made bv the President . . .
and no loncer." did not oust the power of the
president to appoint under U. S. Const, art. 2,
§ 2, and U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 1769, but
merely authorized the circuit justice to fill the
vacancy until the president should act. In re
Farrow, 3 Fed. 112, 4 Woods 491.
16. Com. v. King. 8 Gray (Mass.) 501.
17. State v. Saline County, 60 Nebr. 275,
83 N. W. 70; State v. Rankin, 33 Nebr. 266,
49 N. W. 1121 ; State i'. Walker, 30 Nebr. 501,
40 N. W. 648.
18. State !'. Whitney, 9 Wash. 377, 37 Pac.
473.
19. See infra, II, D, 1.
20. Bechtel v. Farquhar, 21 Pa. Co. Ct.
580.
Failure of a duly elected district attorney
pro tem. to qualify within the time prescribed
bv law creates a vacancy. State v. Barrow,
30 La. Ann. 657.
21. Gosman r. State, 106 Ind. 203, 6 N. E.
349.
22. Glass v. Hutchinson, 55 Kan. 162, 40
Pac. 287.
23. State v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 614. See
infra, II, E, 2.
24. Of deputies, assistants, and substitutes
see infra, VI, B.
Disqualification by engaging In insurrection
or rebellion see In re Tate, 63 N. C. 308.
Disqualification in particular cases see
Criminal Law. 12 Cyc. 530.
Holding other office see Officers. 29 Cyc.
1381.
25. People P. Dorsev. 32 Cal. 296: State r.
Swan, 60 Kan. 461, 56 Pac. 750: State V.
[II. A, 11
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but the better opinion is to the contrary.26 It has also be?n held in a state
holding the former view that disbarment will not disqualify unless it is named as
a circumstance creating a vacancy." A requirement that the prosecuting attor
ney must be learned in the law is satisfied by admission to practice in the courts .
of the same or another state, provided a license from the latter entitles him to
admission in his own state.28 If the prosecuting or district attorney is required
to be a practising attorney in the state, a suspension from practice in any court
thereof renders him ineligible so long as the order of suspension remains in force.2*
If his qualifications are prescribed by the constitution, the legislature cannot
change or add to them.30 Residence within the county or district is usually
necessary,31 and sometimes residence for a certain length of time is requiredv32
2. Women. Unless otherwise provided, it is always understood that only
electors may hold public office;33 and therefore women are not usually eligible
as prosecuting attorneys.34
3. How Determined. If an appointee has already entered upon the duties of
his office, neither the appointing body nor the court may summarily declare the
office vacant because of Ms ineligibility. That question can then be determined
only upon quo warranto proceedings in the proper court.35 It is also a well-
settled rule of public policy that the right of an incumbent de facto cannot be
attacked collaterally. It can be determined only in a direct proceeding instituted
for that purpose.36 A district attorney appointed by authority of law becomes
a de facto officer after undisturbed and unquestioned exercise of the powers of
the office for a time, although at the time of appointment he was ineligible.37
C. Qualification ;s— 1. In General. On his election or appointment a dis
trict or prosecuting attorney must qualify as required by law before entering upon
the discharge of his duties.39 Unless required by law it is not necessary that the
amount of the bond be fixed for each incumbent. A prosecuting attorney-elect
may give bond in the sum last fixed, and it shall be deemed sufficient until a larger
one is ordered.40 Failure to file the certificate of election, properly indorsed and
within the time required, will not work a forfeiture of the office, but the person
elected cannot enter upon the duties of the office until he has complied with the
law in that respect.41
Smith, 50 Kan. 69, 31 Pac. 784; State v. tional qualifications or modify those imposed
Clough, 23 Minn. 17. by the statute.
26. People /;. May. 3 Mich. 598; State v. 31. See State v. Johnston. 101 Ind. 223.
Russell. 83 Wis. 330. 53 N. W. 441. Exclud- 32. Territory v. Smith, 3 Minn. 240, 74
ing consideration of local statutes, the reason Am. Dec. 749.
given for theae decisions appears more logical. 33. See Officers, 29 Cyc. 1370, 1377.
It is certainly reasonable to assume that law- 34. Atty.-Gen. v. Abbott, 121 Mich. 540, 80
makers, using the word " attorney," had in X. W. 372, 47 L. K. A. 92. See Officers, 29
mind an attorney at law, one fitted to dis- Cyc. 1377.
charge the duties of the office, rather than one 35. People v. HalU'tt, 1 Colo. 352; Howard
without knowledge of the law. See also Peo- V. Burns, 14 S. D. 383, 85 N. W. 920. See
pie r. Hallett, 1 Colo. 352, in which the two Officers, 20 Cyc. 1380.
judges disagreed on this point. • 36. U. S. v. Mitchell, 136 Eed. 896. See
27. State v. Swan. 00 Kan. 461, 50 Pac. Officers, 29 Cyc. 1389.
750. 37. U. S. v. Mitchell. 130 Fed. 890, non-
28. Howard V. Burns, 14 S. D. 383, 85 residence. See Officers, 29 Cyc. 1393.
X. W. 920. One who has done nothing so far, except to
29. Brown v. Woods, 2 Okla. 001, 39 Pac. sign an information as assistant, cannot be
473. regarded as a de facto officer. Murrev r.
30. Howard v. Burns, 14 S. D. 383. 85 X. W. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 219, 87 S. W. 349.
*
See
920, holding that since the constitution (art. Officers, 29 Cyc. 1391.
5, $S 24. 25) provides that no person shall be 38. Of deputies, assistants, and substitutes
eligible to the offce of state's attorney, unless see infra, VI, C.
he he learned in the law, a statute (T.aws 39. State v. Colvig, 15 Ore<?. 57, 13 Pac.
(1887), $ 427) requiring persons eligible to 639. And see Officers. 29 Cyc. 1385 ct svq.
the office of district attorney to be admitted 40. Glass v. Hutchinson, 55 Kan. 102, 40
to practice, as an attorney in some court of Pac. 287.
record in the territory was without effect, 41. State F. Colvig, 15 Oreg. 57, 13 Pac.
since the legislature could not prescribe addi- 639.
[II, C, 1]
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2. Refusal of Court to Allow Qualification. The action of the court in deny
ing leave to one duly appointed, to take the oath of office and enter upon the
duties thereof is judicial in its nature, and therefore subject to review by the
appellate court.12
D. Tenure 43— 1. In General. The term and tenure of office of district and
prosecuting attorneys in the states depends of course upon the constitution and
statutes of the particular state.'14 United States district attorneys are appointed
for four years.45 In the absence of any provision of law to the contrary, a district
attorney holds office until the expiration of his term as fixed by law and untn
his successor has qualified.46 If the office is created and the term fixed by the
constitution, the legislature can neither abolish the office nor abridge the term/'
as by providing for a new election before the expiration thereof,48 by redivisiou
of the state into judicial circuits,10 by redividing one circuit into two,50 by changing
the name of the criminal court of the circuit,51 or by assigning his duties to the
attorney of another district.53 Even when the constitution confers upon the
legislature power to abolish the office, it cannot abolish the tenure of any rightful
incumbent.53 Nor will a constitutional amendment creating the office of prose
cuting attorney, but not abolishing the tenure of district attorneys then in office,
take effect until the close of the term for which the latter were elected.34 If the
office be created by the legislature, the same body may either abolish the office,
or extend or abridge the term, in -the absence of constitutional prohibition.55 The
term of office, being fixed by law, cannot be extended by the governor's commis
sion for a longer period.50 ,, ,
2. Of Appointee to Fill Vacancy.57 An appointee to fill a vacancy caused by
death, resignation, or removal, where the office is an elective one, holds only until
the next general election, and until his successor shall qualify.58 But when, as in
42. Bruce v. Fox, 1 Dana (Ky.) 447.
43. Of deputies, assistants, and substitutes
see infra, VI, D.
44. See Cropsey v. Henderson, 63 Ind. 268 ;
Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 450; Bruce v. Fox, 1
Dana (Ky.) 447 (during good behavior and
the continuance of the office) ; Opinion of
Justices, 3 Gray (Mass.) 601; State v. Davis,
44 Mo. 129; State v. Jeter, 1McCord (S. C.) 233.
45. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 769 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 600]. •
46. State v. Wells, 8 Nev. 105; Upshaw v.
Booth, 37 Tex. 125. And see Officers, 29
Cyc. 1399.
47. Moser v. Long, 64 Ind. 189; Adams v.
Roberts, 119 Ky. 364, 83 S. W. 1035, 20 Kv.
L. Rep. 1271 ; People v. Palmer. 154 N. Y. 133,
47 N. E. 1084 [affirmmq 21 X. Y. App. Div.
101, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 403]. See Officebs, 29
Cyc. 1396.
Constitutionality of statute postponing be
ginning of term.— The Ohio act of April 19,
1898, " To amend section 1267 of the Revised
Statutes" (93 Ohio Laws, p. 125), postponing
the beginning of the official terms of prose
cuting attorneys from the first Monday in
January to the first Monday in September,
is void, being in violation of the tenth article
of the constitution, which requires that
county officers shall be elected, and not
within the authority to provide for the filling
of vacancies conferred upon the general as
sembly by the twenty-seventh section of the
second article. State v. Beal, 60 Ohio St.
208. 54 X. E. 84.
48. Barkwell v. State, 4 Tnd. 170.
49. In such case those holding office in the
original circuits become attorneys for the
new circuits in which they reside for the re
mainder of the original term. Moser v. Long,
64 Ind. 189; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355.
And see State e. Peterson, 74 Ind. 174.
50. State r. Johnston, 101 Ind. 223, hold
ing that, although the legislature has the
power to make such a division, the act is un
constitutional so far as it attempts to oust
the prosecuting attorney for the original cir
cuit before expiration of his term.
51. Elam v. State, 75 Ind. 518, holding
that if such an act purports to continue him
in office, he does not hold by virtue thereof,
nor succeed himself, but nolds only for his
original term.
52. Fant r. Gibbs, 54 Miss. 396.
53. Adams v. Roberts, 119 Ky. 364. 83 S. W.
1035, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1271. And see Officebs,
29 Cyc. 1397.
54. Ilavs v. Hays, 5 Ida. 154, 47 Pac. 732.
55. Sta'te P. Trewhitt, 113 Tenn. 561, 82
S. W. 480. See Officers, 29 Cyc. 1396.
Although the legislature has power to ex
tend the term thereof, it cannot continue in
office those previously elected, beyond their
original terms, the constitution providing
that no office created by the legislature shall
be filled otherwise than by the people or the
countv court. State r. Trewhitt, 113 Tenn.
561. 82 S. W. 480.
56. Hench r. State, 72 Ind. 297; Moser r.
Long, 64 Ind. 189.
57. Appointment to fill vacancies see supra,
II, A, 2.
58. Floridn. — Simonton v. State, 44 Fla.
289, 31 So, 821.
[11, C, 2]
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case of sickness and the like, the vacancy is contingent, the appointment lasts
only until such disability is removed.58
E. Removal and Resignation — 1. Rehoval00— a. In General. A dis
trict attorney of the United States may be removed before the expiration of his
term by the president with the consent of the senate, notwithstanding the require
ment of the statute " that he shall be appointed for a term of four years. These
are words of limitation, not of grant.82. And appointment and confirmation by
the senate of a successor nominated by the president is sufficient ratification of
the order of removal.93 The powerof a court to remove its attorney for the state
or commonwealth has been recognized.64 But a state prosecuting attorney whose
term of office is fixed by law cannot, in the absence of a statute, be removed at
the pleasure of the executive.65 If guilty of nonfeasance or malfeasance in office,
a prosecuting attorney forfeits his office and may be removed therefrom by quo
warranto proceedings, or proceedings under the statute, in the proper court.66
Kansas.— State v. Mechem, 31 Kan. 435, 2
Pac. 816.
Louisiatia. — Walsh v. Knickerbocker, 18 La.
Ann. 180.
Xebraska.— State v. Saline County, 60
Kebr. 275, 83 N. W. 70; State v. Rankin, 33
Kebr. 266, 49 N. W. 1121.
Ohio. — Matter of Prosecuting Attv., 2 Ohio
Dec. (Reprint) 602, 4 West. L. Month. 147.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. " District and Prose
cuting Attorneys," § 3.
59. Ex p. Diggs. 50 Ala. 78; Matter of
Prosecuting Attv., 2 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 602,
4 West. L. Month. 147.
60. See, generally, Officers, 29 Cyc. 1406.
Temporary suspension from practice for
misconduct in making misstatement as to de
cision of supreme court sec In re Maestretti,
(Xev. 1908) 93 Pac. 1004, where a prosecut
ing attorney was temporarily suspended from
practice except as to his official duties as dis
trict attorney.
61. I'. S.'Rev. St. (1878) § 769 [U. 8.
Com p. St. (1901) p. 600].
62. Parsons v. U. S., 167 U. S. 324, 17
S. Ct. 880, 42 L. ed. 185 [a/firming 30 Ct. CI.
222].
63. Parsons r. U. S., 30 Ct. CI. 222 [af
firmed in 167 U. S. 324, 17 S. Ct. 880, 42
L. ed. 185].
64. Mills r. Pulaski Cir. Ct, Hard. (Ky.)
139, holding that the circuit courts had power
to remove their attorney for the common
wealth on the ground that he had removed
from the county, and that great inconvenience
had arisen therefrom.
65. V pshaw r. Booth, 37 Tex. 125.
66. State v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 765, 3 Pac.
534 fa/firmed in 112 U. S. 201, 5 S. Ct. 8, 28
L. ed. 629].
Prosecuting attorneys are not state officers,
who may be removed by impeachment only,
as provided in the constitution : but the
legislature may provide other modes for their
removal. Ex p. Wiley. 54 Ala. 226.
The prosecuting attorney is subject to for
feiture of his office for giving professional
assistance to a defendant in a criminal prose
cution (In re Vow, 1.1 X. D. 540, 90 X. W.
15), or for gross immorality (Moore v. Strick-
Hng, 46 W. Va. 515. 33 S. E. 274. 50 L. R. A.
279). A state's attorney, who, on several
occasions, enters a public gambling house,
and bets money on a roulette wheel, or other
wise gambles for money there, and wilfully
refrains from informing and prosecuting the
keeper of such place, is guilty of a misde
meanor involving moral turpitude, as such
failure to inform and prosecute such keeper
involves the violation of an official oath and
the violation of the express command of N. D.
Rev. Codes ( 1899), § 7243. In re Voss, supra.
If a public officer, whose duty it is to prose
cute the keeper and inmates of a house of ill
fame, resorts to the same for immoral pur
poses, he is guilty of gross immorality, and
thereby forfeits his office. Moore v. Strick-
ling, supra.
Neglect.— Failure to prosecute violations
of law within his knowledge is ground for
forfeiture of office, as well as disbarment and
suspension. In re Voss, 11 X. D. 540, 90
X. W. 15.
It is no excuse for nonfeasance that public
sentiment was adverse to the enforcement of
the law. State v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 765, 3
Pac. 534 [affirmed in 112 IT. S. 201, 5 S. Ct.
8, 28 L. ed. 629] ; In re Voss, 11 X. D. 540, 90
X. W. 15.
In quo warranto to remove from office a
county attorney charged with violating his
duty in respect to the enforcement of the pro
hibitory liquor law the issue of primary im
portance is that concerning defendant's good
faith in his official conduct. The law pre
sumes that defendant acted in good faith in
all the matters charged against him, and the
burden rests upon the state to show other
wise by a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Trinkle, 70 Kan. 396, 78 Pac. 854.
A county attorney is not obliged to institute
proceedings for the punishment of offenders
against the prohibitory liquor law upon his
own knowledge; but whenever notified by an
officer or other person of any violation of that
.law it is his duty forthwith to exercise dili
gently all the authority conferred on him by
law for the purpose of disclosing, prosecuting,
and punishing the offender. State v. Trinkle,
supra. Cpon the trial of such an action
evidence that saloons were run oppnly and
nubliely in defendant's county is relevant as
bearing upon his motives in dealing with
specific offenses of which he had been duly
[II, E, 1, a]
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Mere misconduct while in office, not official misconduct, is not sufficient.67 Causes
of removal or suspension are sometimes prescribed by the constitution or by
statute; but if they are prescribed by the constitution the legislature cannot pre
scribe other or different causes.8*
b. Method.90 If the law prescribes no other method of removing prosecuting
attorneys, the appointing body may remove them, the power of removal being
incident to the power of appointment.70 In such case, if no term of office is fixed
by law, the appointing body may remove them and appoint others in their stead
without assigning any reason therefor.71 If the method of removal is prescribed
by the constitution, the legislature has no power to prescribe any other mode.72
e. Praetiee.73 Unless required by statute, neither indictment, trial, nor con
viction are a prerequisite to the removal of a prosecuting attorney for official
misconduct.74 The trial of charges against a prosecuting attorney for his removal
from office is not within the constitutional provision for trial by jury; 7S nor is it
necessary that the complaint of official neglect or misconduct shall be verified by
oath, where the statute does not require it.78 A criminal prosecution against a
county attorney will not prevent proceedings by a statutory civil action to remove
him for misconduct in office.77 On the trial of a proceeding to remove a prosecut
ing attorney for misconduct in office, based upon charges of crime, he cannot be
required to testify, where a statute provides that on trial of all indictments,
complaints, or proceedings against any person, he shall not be a competent wit
ness except upon his own request.78 As a rule an appeal or writ of error will lie
to or from a judgment of removal.79
2. Resignation. The resignation of prosecuting and district attorneys is
governed by the same principles as that of other officers.80 The mode of resigning
and the formalities to be observed are usually prescribed by statute.81 Where a
resignation is required to be made to the court it cannot be made to the judge
notified. State v. Trinkle, supra. If n county
attorney be notified of a violation of the pro
hibitory liquor law, and be furnished with
the names of witnesses by whom the fact of
such violation may be established, he cannot
unnecessarily delay an investigation of the
matter, or a prosecution, if the facts war
rant, merely because the city in which the
offense occurred is about to institute or has
instituted proceedings under its ordinances
for punishing the offense. His duties arc not
dischargeable by the city authorities, and a
city prosecution is not a mere substitute for
a prosecution by the state. State v. Trinkle,
supra.
67. Graham v. Stein, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 770,
4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 140.
Failure to perform, or an agreement not to
perform, any of the duties of the office is" official misconduct." Oraham v. Stein, 18
Ohio Cir. Ct. 770, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 140.
Sufficiency of charge of " official miscon
duct " see Trigg v. State, 49 Tex. 645.
68. Lowe v. Com., 3 Mete. (Ky.) 237.
A statute providing for removal or suspen
sion while under indictment does not apply
to indictments found for an offense which
was committed before the act. Ex p. Di<*"s,
52 Ala. 381.
69. See, generally, Officers. 29 Cyc. 1406.
Quo warranto see supra. II, E, 1, 9; and,
generally. Quo Warranto.
70. Ex p. Bouldin. 6 Leigh (Va.) 639. See
also Officers, 29 Cyc. 1406.
71. Ex p. Bouldin, r>Leigh (Va.) 639.
72. Lowe v. Com., 3 Mete. (Ky.) 237. See
also Officers, 29 Cyc. 1410.
73. See, generally" Officers, 29 Cvc. 1409-
1413.
74. State v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 765, 3 Pac.
534 [affirmed in 112 U. S. 201, 5 S. Ct. 8,
28 L. ed. G29] ; Graham v. Stein, 18 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 770, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 140.
75. Moore v. Strickling. 4(1W. Va. 515, 33
S. E. 274, 50 L. P.. A. 279. See, generally,
Juries, 24 Cvc. 82.
76. Graham* r. Stein, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 770,
4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 140.
77. State r. Foster, 32 Kan. 14. 765. 3 Pac.
534 [affirmed in 112 U. S. 201, 5 S. Ct. 8, 28
L. ed. 629].
78. Killits v. State, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 740, 10
Ohio Cir. Dec. 722.
79. Killits v. State, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 740, 10
Ohio Cir. Dec. 722.
80. See Officers. 29 Cvc. 1403.
81. State r. Kovolosky, 92 Iowa 498, 62
X. \V. 223, holding that under Iowa Code
(1873), § 782, subd. 4. providing for the
resignation of (ill " county officers " to be
tendered to the hoard of supervisors, and
. subdivision 2, requiring resignation of " dis
trict attorneys" to be tendered to the gov
ernor, and the later act creating the office of
county attorney and providing that when
ever the term "district attorney" Hppears
in the laws, it shall mean " county attor
ney." and repealing all inconsistent acts, the
resignation of a county attorney is properly
tendered to the board of supervisors.
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during vacation. Although accepted by him and entered upon the record, such
resignation does not create a vacancy.82
F. Effect of Redividing State into Judicial Districts. Such division,
as has been seen, cannot be so made as to abridge the constitutional term of office
of any rightful incumbent.83 If the legislature, acting under authority expressly
conferred by the constitution, transfers the county of residence of a district attor
ney to another district, he does not become the prosecuting attorney for the latter
district.84 But he remains the attorney for his original district.85 When a new
county is added to a criminal circuit, the solicitor for that circuit is entitled to
the office for that county also, no other solicitor being provided.86
III. COMPENSATION AND FEES.87
A. Of State Prosecuting and District Attorneys — 1. In General. At
common law those who accepted public office were presumed to give their serv
ices.88 The right of a prosecuting attorney to compensation is therefore purely
statutory. He is not entitled to any salary, fees, or costs except as expressly
provided by law.8" Being in derogation of the common law, fees provided by
82. State v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 614.
83. See supra, II, D, 1.
84. People r. Annis, 10 Colo. 53, 14 Pac. 52.
85. Adams v. Roberts, 119 Kv. 304, 83
S. W. 1035, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1271.
Notwithstanding the constitutional provi
sions that he must be a resident of the dis
trict in which he is elected, his term of office
being fixed by the constitution, the legis
lature cannot bv such method abridge it.
Adams v. Roberts, 119 Ky. 304, S3 S. W.
1035, 26 Kv. L. Rep. 1271. See supra, II,
D, 1.
86. McCall r. Webb. 125 X. C. 243, 34 S. E.
430; McCall v. Gardner, 125 X. C. 238, 34
S. E. 434.
87. See, generally, Officers, 29 Cyc. 1422.
Change during term see People r. Williams,
232 111. 519, 83 X. E. 1047; Spalding v.
Thornhery, 103 S. W. 291, 31 Ky. L. Rep.
738; and Offickbs, 29 Cyc. 1427.
88. Benton County r. Hannan, 101 Ind.
551; Bvnum r. Greene County, 100 Ind. 90.
See Officers, 29 Cyc. 1422.
89. Arkansas. — Phillips County V. Jack
son. 85 Ark. 382. 108 S. W. 212; State v.
McNair, 70 Ark. 65, CO S. W. 144.
Colorado.— Menvin v. Boulder County, 29
Colo. 169, 67 Pac. 285; Fremont County v.
Wilson, 3 Colo. App. 492, 34 Pac. 265.
Georgia. — See Tanner v. O'Neill, 108 Ga.
245. 33 S. E. 884.
Illinois.— Cook County v. Healy, 222 111.
310, 78 X. E. 623.
Indiana.—Wood v. Madison County, 125
Ind. 270, 25 X. E. 188; State v. Jackaon, 68
Ind. 58.
Kentucky.— Power v. Fleming County, 99
Ky. 200, 35 S. W. 541, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 61.
Michigan.— Willcox r. Wavne Cir. Judge,
83 Mich. 1, 47 X. W. 29,
Mississippi. — Miller v. State, 69 Miss. 112,
12 So. 265.
Missouri.— Hill v. Butler County, 195 Mo.
511. 94 6. VV. 518.
Xerada.— State v. Shearer, 23 Xev. 76, 42
Pac. 582.
Xew Hampshire.— Fletcher v. Merrimack
County, 71 X. II. 96, 51 Atl. 271.
Tennessee. — State v. Lowenstine, 4 Lea
737; State v. Foster, 4 Lea 736; State v.
Frost, 4 Lea 735 ; State v. Miller, 4 Lea 734 ;
Mooneys v. State, 2 Yerg. 578.
Texas. —"Sta,te v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307;
Howth v. Greer, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 552, 90
S. W. 211; Harris C'ountv V. Stewart, 17
Tex. Civ. App. 1, 43 S. W. 52. Under
Sayles Civ. St. arts. 2495c, 24954, providing
that county attorneys in counties that cast
seven thousand five hundred votes in the
presidential election of 1896 shall receive
fees' amounting to two thousand five hun
dred dollars per annum, and, in addition
thereto, one fourth of the excess of fees col
lected by them, and requiring them to pay to
the county treasurers all fees collected in ex
cess of the maximum amount allowed and
of the one fourth of the excess of such maxi
mum for their services, and for the services
of their assistants, the attorneys are entitled
to two thousand five hundred dollars out of
the fees collected and one fourth the fees
above such sum, and their assistants are to
be paid out of the remainder, and the bal
ance paid to the county treasurers. H»re v.
Gravson County, (Civ. App. 1899), 51 S. W.
656.'
Wisconsin.— State v. KrOmer, 38 Wis. 547.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. " District and Prose
cuting Attorneys," $ IS el seq.
Validity of particular statutes as to com
pensation see State i\ McMillan, 55 Fla. 246,
45 So. 882; Butler v. Stephens, 110 Kv. 616,
84 S. W. 745, 27 Kv. L. Rep. 241: Golds-
borough i>. Lloyd, 86 Md. 374, 38 Atl. 773;
State v. Lucas County, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. 170;
and infra, this section, text and note 1.
Power of county board. — Under Kan. Gen.
St. (1889) par. 1799 (Gen. St. (1897) c. 30,
S8 66-68), the board of county commis
sioners of a county having a population
between one thousand and five thousand was
given the authority and discretion to fix the
salary of the countv attorney of such county
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statute, to be paid to the prosecuting attorney in a certain event, cannot be
recovered if the proceeding does not take the course mentioned.90 He is not
entitled to compensation for services not required by law; 01 nor for services
required by law and actually performed, if no fees are provided for.92 Salary is
an incident of the office; it is not dependent upon the rendition of services. Pay
ment to an incumbent de facto does not deprive the district attorney having legal
title to the office, of his right to such salary.93 But the right to fees arises only
upon services rendered.9' In providing fees, it is not always clear what is meant
by "each case," "each prosecution," or "proceeding," etc.95 If the statute pro
at a less sum than four hundred dollars.
Navlor v. Gray County, 8 Kan. App. 761,
61 "Pac. 763.
In divorce cases.— When the prosecuting at
torney merely appears at the examination
of the witnesses in a divorce case the parties
to which have one child, and at the con
clusion of the testimony announces that he
does not think it necessary to contest the
granting of a divorce, he is entitled to no
fee, under Mich. Pub. Acts (1887), p. 152,
providing that every petition for divorce
shall set forth the names and ages of all
the children of the marriage, ami when there
are any under fourteen years old, a sub
poena shall issue to the prosecuting attorney,
who .shall enter his' appearance, and oppose
the granting of a divorce, if in his judgment
the interests of the children or the public
good require it, and that for every case he
contests he shall receive five dollars. Will-
cox v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. I, 47 N. W. 29.
In Illinois section 2 of the act of 1901
(Laws (1001), p. 207), fixing the salary of
the state's attorney of Cook county, is void
because of alterations' and irregularities in
its passage, but the other sections of the
act are unaffected and valid; and as the act
of 1871, relating to the salaries of judges
of the circuit and superior courts and the
state's attorney of Cook county, is thereby
repealed, there is no law in force fixing the
salary to be paid by the county of Cook to
its state's attornev. Cook County r. Healy,
222 111. 310, 78 N."E. 623.
In Kentucky, under St. (1903) % 132, pro
viding that the county attorney shall he al
lowed annually a reasonable salary to be
paid out of the county levy, the salary must
be a fixed sum, and not dependent on con
tingent fees, since to make an allowance pay
able out of such levy necessarily means that
a certain sum is' to be allowed, so that the
county treasurer will have a definite order
of the fiscal court to direct him in paying
the claim. Spalding r. Thornburv, 103 S. W.
291, 108 S. W. 906, 31 Kv. L. Rep. 738, 33
Kv. L. Rep. 362.
90. Willcox v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 1, 47 N. W.
29.
No fee can be recovered for services upon
the imposition of fines for contempt (Buck
ingham p. People. 26 111. App. 269) ; nor in
BUits for forfeitures on recognizances (Buck
ingham v. People, 26 111. App. 269 ; People
r. Van Wyck, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 260) ; nor on
a recognizance to keep the peace (State r.
Red, 24 N. C. 265; Mooneys v. State, 2 Yerg.
(Tenn.) 578) ; where the statute does not
provide any. He is not entitled to compensa
tion for attendance upon the court except
when the attorney-general also attends upon
requisition of the governor, or of a Judge
of the supreme or circuit court, the statute
providing a fee only in such cases. People
V. Schoharie Sup'rs, 6 Wend. (X. Y.) 505.
A fee allowed in the event a certain judg
ment is rendered cannot be recovered except
upon final judgment, unreversed by a higher
court. People v. Flynn, 59 111. App. 173.
A percentage, to be paid to the attorney
who assisted " when judgment was rendered
"
cannot be recovered by the county attorney
whose term expired before rendition of the
judgment, although he assisted at the trial.
Spaulding r. Hill, 115 Kv. 1, 72 S. W. 307,
24 Ky. L. Rep. 1802.
91.
*
California. — San Diego Countv v. Cali
fornia, etc., R. Co., (1884) 1 Pac. 897.
Kentucky. — Power p. Fleming Countv, 99
Ky. 200, 35 S. W. 541, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 61*.
Missouri. — Lackland v. Doughertv, 15 Mo.
200.
Atck> York.— People v. New York, 1 Hill
362 ; People v. Van Wyck, 4 Cow. 260.
North Carolina.— Randolph Countv Ct. v.
Johnson, 10 X. C. 238.
Texas. — Spencer v. Galveston County, 56
Tex. 384; Harris' Countv v. Stewart. 17' Tex.
Civ. App. 1, 43 S. W. 52.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. " District and Prose
cuting Attornevs," § 18 et seq.
92. Reynolds" r. McAfee, 44 Ala. 237;
Thomas "p. Thomas, 61 Ga. 70; Dodd r.
Sweetser. 14 Tnd. 292; Miller v. State, 69
Miss. 112, 12 So. 205.
The court has no power to allow fees where
the law has failed to do so. State v. Moore,
57 Tex. 307.
93. People v. Smyth, 28 Cal. 21. See also
infra, III, A, 10, c; and Officers, 29 Cvc.
1430.
94. O'Connor r. East Baton Rouge Parish,
31 La. Ann. 221 ; Foute v. New Orleans, 20
La. Ann. 22.
One who merely enters an appearance but
takes no further steps is not entitled to fees.
Edwards v. Fresno County, 74 Cal. 475, 16
Pac. 239; McMullin v. Montrose Countv, 18
Colo. App. 117, 70. Pac. 449; State P. Jack
son. 68 Ind. 58.
95. It seems that the prosecuting attorney
is entitled to the fee allowed by law when
the costs are adjudged against the defendant,
on scire facias against a delinquent public
officer, if the costs' are adjudged against him.
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vides a fee "for each judgment recovered" against a sheriff for failure to return
executions, he is entitled to such fee for .each motion made, although the court
consolidated all such motions and rendered but one judgment.96 Under a statute
allowing a fee for each prosecution in behalf of the state in which costs are taxed
against the defendant, only one fee is earned by the commonwealth attorney upon
scire facias issued to several persons bound together in a recognizance which has
been forfeited.87 A special act fixing the fee of a certain prosecuting attorney
is not repealed by a general fee law.98 Nor does a later act increasing the fees
of prosecuting attorneys generally increase those of a solicitor whose office was
created by a special act providing that his fees should be the same as those then
received by other prosecuting attorneys for like services.90 Of course if the fees
or other compensation of prosecuting attorneys are fixed by the constitution,
they cannot be reduced or otherwise changed by the legislature.1 Sometimes
prosecuting attorneys are required to account to the county for fees collected
by them.2
State v. Whitsenhunt, 5 N. C. 287; State v.
Fields, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 137. A fee al
lowed " for all other eases " in the supreme
court is to be paid only for each bill of ex
ception, although there may be more than
one plaintiff therein. Each bill of exceptions
is one case. In re Kenan, 103 Ga. S19, 35
S. E. 312. If allowed for proceeding against
a clerk for failure to enroll cases as required
by law, he is entitled to the same for each
ca.* which the clerk failed to enroll, not
withstanding but one motion is made by the
state's attorney for all such delinquencies
occurring during his term. Wright t". Shelby
County. 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 145.
96. State v. McDonald, 9 Humphr. (Tenn.)
606. Contra, State v. MooTe, 57 Tex. 307.
97. State r. Robinson, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.)
370.
98. Mauro r. Buffington, 26 Mo. 184.
99. Johnston v. Lovett, 65 Ga. 716.
1. Ooldsborough r. Lloyd, 86 Md. 374, 38
Atl. 773. holding that under Const, art. 15,
f 1. providing for compensation of certain
officials (among others, state's attorneys),
and allowing them to retain for their re
muneration fees received to the amount of
three thousand dollars, Loc. Acts (1804), c.
213, limiting the compensation of state's at
torney in the county of Dorchester to one
thousand two hundred dollars, is unconsti
tutional, if the fees actually earned accord
ing to the rates fixed by law amount to more
than the sum total specified in the act. But
under Ky. Const. § 235, providing that the
salaries of public officers shall not be
changed during their term of office, and sec
tion 98 declaring that the compensation of
the commonwealth's attorney shall be by
salary of. five hundred dollars per annum,
payable out of the state treasury, and such
percentage of fines and forfeitures' as may
be fixed by law. it was held that an act cre
ating an additional judicial district, the ef
fect of which was to withdraw one of the
counties from the district in which complain
ant was commonwealth's attorney during his
term of office, and lessen the amount of the
fines and penalties he would otherwise have
received, but which did not diminish his sal
ary of five hundred dollars nor the "per
centage" of fines and forfeitures to which
he was entitled, was not unconstitutional.
Butler v. Stephens, 119 Ky. 616, 84 S. W.
745, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 241. Tex. Const, art.
5, § 21, prescribes that county attorneys'
" shall represent the state in all cases in the
district and inferior courts in their respec
tive counties," with the qualification that, if
a county is in a district having a district at
torney, the respective duties of district and
county attorneys shall be regulated by the
legislature. The act of the twenty-sixth
legislature establishing corporation courts
provides that in state cases prosecuted by
the city attorney the county attorney, if he
so desires, may so represent the state, but
that he shall not be entitled to receive any
fees or compensation therefor. It was held
that such act is not unconstitutional, in so
far as it provides that the county attorney
shall not be entitled to receive any fees or
compensation in such cases. Upton r. San
Angelo, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 94 S. W. 436.
Sayles Cir. St. Tex. art. 2495c, entitling
county attorneya of certain counties to only
a part of the fees attached to their office, is
not repugnant to Const, art. 5. § 21, provid
ing that county attorneys shall receive a3
compensation only such fees as may be pre
scribed hv law. Hare v. Gravson County,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 51 S. W."056.
The office of prosecuting attorney must be
held a state office within Ark. St. art. 19,
§ 23. providing that no officer of a state,
nor of any county, city, or town shall receive
for salary, fees, etc., more than five thou
sand dollars net profits per annum, and re
quiring all sums in excess thereof to be paid
into the state, county, or city treasury, not
withstanding the act* of Feb. 'l
,
1S75, p. 124,
carrying out the provisions of the article aS
to other state and county officers, construed
it as not applving to the office of prosecuting
attorney. Griffin v. Rhoton. 85 Ark. 89, 107
S. W. 380.
Constitutional provision not self-executing.
— Griffin r. Rhoton. 85 Ark. 89, 107 S. W.
380, referred to supra, this note. And see
Constitutional L.vw, 8 Cvc. 752.
2. See Nolan V. Ellis County, 65 Kan. 57,
68 Pac. 1068.
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2. In Criminal Prosecutions3 — a. In General. The fees of prosecuting
attorneys in criminal cases depend of course upon the statutes in the particular
jurisdiction.4 The fees of the prosecuting attorney are a proper item of costs
to be taxed against the defendant; and it has been held that they are not imposed
as a part of the punishment, but in order that the state may prosecute the guilty
at their own expense.5 On the other hand, however, it has been held that the
act providing therefor is penal in its nature,6 and the solicitor therefore is not
entitled to such fee on a conviction for an offense committed before the passage
of the act, although the defendant was indicted and tried afterward.7 If a lesser
fee be provided by the new act, the solicitor shall receive only that, notwithstand>
ing the indictment was found and returned before its enactment.8 An act which
reduces the grade of an offense necessarily reduces the fee allowed in such cases,
where the existing law provides different fees for the respective grades.9
b. Indictment and Trial Fees. For instruments returned by the grand jury
"not true bills," it has been held that the prosecuting attorney is not entitled
to the fee allowed for drawing indictments; 10 nor to the fee in criminal actions,
since such action is commenced only when an indictment is found and filed with
the clerk.11 If the statute provides fees, so much for drawing indictments, and
so much for engrossing them, the district attorney is entitled to the full fee for an
indictment so well drawn that it is not necessary to engross it.12 If the pros
ecuting attorney is also a justice of the peace, he is not entitled to justice's fees
for drawing complaints and warrants which it is his duty as solicitor to draw,
the statute providing that his salary shall be in full for all services.13
e. Upon Termination of Prosecution. A case placed upon the retired docket
is not thereby disposed of, and the attorney cannot then recover the fee provided
in cases nolle prossed. or of acquittal." A statute fixing fees in cases settled by
leave of court includes those in which a nolle pros, has been entered.15 He cannot
recover fees provided for "convictions," "judgments in favor of the state," etc.,
Tenn. Acts (1897), c. 41, which fixes the
compensation of each district attorney-gen
eral, and provides that the fees provided by
law shall be taxed as cos'ts against the losing
party, and turned over to the state, requires
that the ^sts allowed a district attorney-
general in an inheritance tax case shall be
turned over to the state. Harrison v. John
ston, 109 Tenn. 245, 70 S. W. 414.
3. Criminal and civil proceedings distin
guished see infra, I II, A, 3.
4. See supra, III, A, 1.
Construction of particular statutes see In
re Kenan, 109 Ga. 819, 35 S. E. 312 (fees
of solicitors-general) ; Tanner v. O'Xeill, 10S
Ga. 245, 33 S. E. 884 (solicitor of criminal
court of Atlanta) ; Taylor v. Van Epps, 58
Ga. 139 (solicitor-general of city court of
Atlanta). Under Shannon Code Tenn.
§ 6380, providing that in cases of misde
meanor, where a nolle prosequi is entered,
no fee shall he allowed the attorney-general,
find section 6383, prohibiting fees to the at
torney-general where a bill of indictment is
ignored by the grand jury, the district at
torney is not entitled to fees from the county
in cases in which a nolle prosequi was en
tered after indictment, and in those which
were ignored by the grand jury, and no in
dictments found. Donaldson r. Walker, 101
Tenn. 236, 47 t>.W. 417.
Attendance at preliminary examinations.—
Mo. Rev. St. (1899) § 3237, authorizing fees
to a prosecuting attorney fur judgment on
any proceeding of a criminal nature, other
wise than by indictment or information, and
for his services in actions which it shall be
made his duty by law to prosecute or de
fend, does not authorize the payment of a
fee for his' attendance at the preliminary ex
amination in felonv cases. Hill v. Butler
County, 195 Mo. oil, 94 S. W. 518.
5. Fanning r. State, 47 Ark. 442, 2 S. W.
70; State v. Schmidt, 34 Kan. 399, 8 Pac.
8G7 ; Fears r. Ellis Countv, 20 Tex. Civ. App.
159, 49 S. W. 139.
Costs in criminal cases see Costs, 11 Cyc.
267.
Taxing fees as costs see Costs, 11 Cyc.
280.
6. Dent i\ State, 42 Ala. 514.
7. Caldwell v. State, 55 Ala. 133.
8. Charter v. State, 36 Miss. 75.
9. In re Kenan, 109 Ga. 819, 35 S. E. 312;
State v. Tyler, 85 X. C. 569.
10. Arapahoe County v. Graham, 4 Colo.
201. Contra, Williams v. Jefferson County,
2 Mont. 26, notwithstanding the same stat
ute provides that it shall not be allowed for
drawing anv indictment that mav be quashed.
11. Union County v. Hyde, 26 Oreg. 24, 37
Pac. 76.
12. In re Dist. Attvs.' Fees, 6 Hill (N. Y.)
402.
13. Fletcher v. Merrimack County, 71 N. H.
90, 51 Atl. 271.
14. State r. Ellis, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 549.
15. Koch v. Schuylkill County, 12 Pa.
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for services rendered in the trial of criminal actions which are nolle prossed or result
otherwise than in conviction.16 He cannot claim a fee as for "final conviction,"
if
,
after conviction, the case is nolle prossed. or reversed; 17 nor the fee allowed for
prosecuting certain crimes, if defendant is convicted of a lesser offense.18 If the
fee is simply for conviction, but one can be recovered, although the defendant is
convicted in both courts.19 An agreement by the defendant, on condition of
dismissing the prosecution, to pay costs as on conviction, is contrary to public
policy, and the attorney cannot have his fee taxed as upon conviction.20 He is
entitled only to the fee provided for cases nolle prossed.21 Under a statute per
mitting the attorney to recover from the county one-half the regular fee if costs
cannot be collected from the defendant, he is not entitled to the full fee when
the defendant works out his costs in hard labor for the county.22 And where
there are several defendants he is not entitled to receive from the state compensa
tion for services rendered in the supreme court without a certificate from the clerk
of the trial court that each defendant is insolvent.23
d. Several Defendants. As a rule the prosecuting attorney is entitled to but
one fee where several persons arc jointly indicted and jointly tried.24 He is entitled
to but one fee where separate trials are ordered, but on conviction of one the others
plead guilty and but a single judgment is rendered against all.25
e. Several Counts. Under some statutes, if there are several counts in an
indictment and the defendant is convicted upon two or more, the prosecuting
attorney is allowed the fee for conviction upon each count, although there is but
one judgment; 2a but under others only one fee is allowed.27
3. Civil Actions and Proceedings. Fees fixed for civil and for criminal proceed
ings are to be distinguished. Scire facias on the bail-bond of a criminal is a civil
action, and the prosecuting attorney in such case is entitled only to the fee provided
Super. Ct. 567, but not if entered before in
dictment found.
16. Canthorn r. State, 41 Ark. 488; Patton
r. State, 41 Ark. 486; Xourse v. Warren
Countv, 17 Ind. 355; State p. Foss, 52 Mo.
416; State v. Thompson, 39 Mo. 427; State v.
Beard, 31 Mo. 34; Dunkle v. Warren Countv,
17 Pa. Co. Ct. 400.
The fee for " convictions where the punish
ment is death" is due upon conviction of
such crime, notwithstanding the sentence be
commuted by the governor, court, or jurv.
State p. Hill, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 98.
17. Leach r. State, 8 Lea ( Tenn. ) 35 ; Keys
r. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 408.
Where a prisoner escapes before trial, the
solicitor is entitled only to the costs which
have accrued up to that time. Robinson ('.
Smith. 57 Oa. 332.
18. Bales p. State, 19 Ark. 220; In re Mad-
dox, 111 Ga. 647, 36 S. E. 859; State v.
O'Kane, 23 Kan. 244; State i\ Kennedy, 4
Lea (Tenn.) 223.
19. Com. p. Rogers. 9 Gray (Mass.) 278;
Huizar v. State, (Tex. Cr. App. 1901) 63
S
. W. 329.
If allowed " in all prosecutions," the dis
trict attorney is entitled to same in each
court in which the case is tried. Fields r.
State. Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 168.
Upon conviction, appeal, and reversal, and
acquittal after new trial, he is entitled to
both fees, viz., to that allowed in case of con
viction, and to that allowed for acquittal.
State i\ Graves, 0 Baxt. (Tenn.) 488.
If fees are allowed for conviction in an in
ferior court, and also for all prosecutions in
the superior or circuit court, an appeal from
one to the other does not vacate the judgment
of the former so as to deprive the attorney of
such fee allowed for conviction therein; in
such case he is entitled to both. Ard P. State,
114 Ind. 542, 16 X. E. 504.
20. State i>. Foss, 52 Mo. 416; State r.
Narramore, 52 Mo. 27.
21. State p. Bachman, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 649.
22. Knox p. State, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 202.
23. In re Kenan, 109 Ga. 819, 35 S. E. 312.
24. A la bama.— Brown v. State, 46 Ala.
148; Dent v. State, 42 Ala. 514.
Arkansas.— Fanning r. State, 47 Ark. 442,
2 S. W. 70.
Indiana.— Bunday i>. State, 6 Ind. 398.
Missouri. — In re Murphv, 22 Mo. App.
470.
Oregon. — Union Countv v. Hyde, 2<5Oreg.
24, 37 Pac. 76.
Tennessee. — Carroway v. State, 5 Humphr.
523.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. " District and Prose
cuting Attorneys," § 19.
Contra.— State p. Kinneman, 39 Ind. 36;
State v. Cripe, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 6; State r.
Hunter, 33 Iowa 361 ; Penland v. State, 1
Humphr. (Tenn.) 383.
25. State p. Granville. 26 Kan. 158.
26. Hempstead County P. McCollum, 58
Ark. 159, 24 S. W. 9 (where the statute al
lowed a fee "for each conviction"); Bor-
schenious v. People, 41 111. 236 ("for each
conviction ").
27. State r. Peck, 51 Mo. Ill; Ex p. Craig,
19 Mo. 337, where the statute allowed a fee
" for a conviction in any ease."
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by law for the prosecution of civil actions.28 If the sureties on a forfeited appeal-
bond consent to judgment and pay over the amount to the district attorney, he
is entitled to the fee allowed in "civil proceedings," although none were had.29
It has been held in Kentucky that if a judgment of forfeiture be rendered, the
county attorney is not entitled to the percentage allowed "in all prosecutions in
which judgment is rendered in favor of the commonwealth," on the ground that
the word "prosecutions" means criminal proceedings;30 but in Tennessee, under
a statute providing a fee in all "prosecutions in behalf of the state," it was held
that a prosecuting attorney is entitled to the fee in scire facias on a bail-bond 31
and also in a proceeding against a constable to remove him from office,33 as such
proceedings are "prosecutions" within the meaning of the statute. Qui tam
actions for a penalty, although tried as civil actions, are within the statute pro
viding fees in proceedings of a criminal nature.33
4. Deductions. The legislature having entire control of the compensation of
district and prosecuting attorneys, it may direct deduction therefrom for the
payment of attorneys -pro tem.3i But the court cannot make any deduction for
any purposes, unless expressly permitted to do so by law.35
5. Commissions on Fines and Collections. Fees taxed against the defendant
and commissions on fines and forfeitures were formerly given in lieu of salary.
Salaries are now generally provided by statute, the district or prosecuting attor
ney being sometimes allowed certain commissions besides. But ho is not entitled
to commissions in any case unless clearly allowed by law.38 No commissions are
28. State v. Armstrong, 3 Blaekf. (Tnd.)
42.
29. Colvig v. Klamath, 16 Oreg. 244, 18
Pac. 80.
30. Williams p. Shelbourne, 102 Ky. 579,
44 S. W. 110, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1927; Fultz v.
Crofton, 42 S. W. 841, 19 Kv. L. Rep. 1921.
31. State v. Robinson, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 370.
32. State p. Fields, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.)
137.
33. State c. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 30 Mo.
App. 494.
34. White v. Berry, 28 Ark. 198.
A constitutional provision that the prose
cuting attorney's salary shall be " fixed " by
the legislature is not violated by a statute
directing deduction from such salary for other
causes than those named in the constitution,
the word " fixed " serving merely to denote
the change from a fee svstem to salaries.
Cole V. Humphries, 78 Miss. 1<33.28 So. 808.
35. State v. Lauder, 11 N. D. 136, 90 N. W.
564, holding that the court could not deduct
compensation of an appointee who prose
cuted the action upon refusal of the state's
attorney to do so. notwithstanding the court
had power and it was its duty to appoint
another to prosecute in such case; where the
statute made no provision for deduction from
the salary of the state's attorney except when
" absent ... or unable to perform the duties
of his office."
36. He is not entitled to the commission
allowed on forfeited bail-bonds, fines, etc.,
until forfeiture has been declared, by judg
ment or otherwise, and the money collected
thereon. Stamper r. State. 11 Ga. 643; Ex
p. Ford. 74 Tnd. 415; State p. Barron. 74
Tnd. 374: Christian p. Bvars, 90 Kv. 536. 14
S. W. 491. 12 Kv. L. Rep. 460;' Com. P.
OfTut, 82 Kv. 326; Stone p. Riddell. 5 Bush
(Ky.) 349; "Bryant r. Com., 3 Bush (Ky.)
9. No commission is earned upon a forfeited
bail bond if the accused is surrendered in
open court by his sureties In discharge of
their liability. Stamper c. State, 11 Ga. 643.
La. Const. (1898) arts. 125, 180, providing
for compensation of district attorneys, and
prohibiting any officer whose salary is fixed
by the constitution to be allowed any other
fees or perquisites except those otherwise pro
vided for by the constitution, are not suscep
tible of the construction that they intended
to allow district attorneys to collect commis
sions, as distinguished from fees, save as pro
vided bv the constitution itself. State v.
Henderson, 120 La. 535, 45 So. 430.
La. Act (1880), p. 122, No. 96, defining the
duties of district attorneys, deals with the
whole subject of their duties and compensa
tion, and it so modified and superseded the
then existing law as to preclude any recov
ery by the district attorneys of the one fifth
part of the fines imposed after deducting the
commission of the sheriff, in addition to the
fee provided bv section 3 of said act. State v.
Henderson, 12*0La. 535, 45 So. 430.
On remission of forfeiture. — Under N. C.
Revisal (1905), § 2768, providing that the
state solicitors shall prosecute suits to re
cover all penalties, and on forfeited recog
nizances entered in their courts, and as com
pensation, shall receive a sum to be fixed by
the court, not more than five per cent of the
amount collected on such penalty or forfeited
recognizance, where a judgment absolute is
entered on a recognizance according to a
scire facias in a prosecution for misdemeanor,
such judgment does not confer on the solici
tor a vested right to the commission so as to
preclude the judge from subsequently depriv
ing the solicitor thereof by remission as
authorized bv section 3220. State r. King,
143 N. C. 677, 57 S. E. 516.
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due upon a money judgment compromised by the acceptance of property; " nor
out of moneys which do not go to the benefit of the county; 3S nor on fines or for
feitures paid in work for the county; 30 nor on fines remitted by the governor.40
A percentage of amounts "recovered," "collected," etc., in favor of the state
applies only to cases of money demand; 4l and only to moneys collected, by him
self. He has no interest in fines imposed or collected without the aid of his serv
ices.42 It has been held that a prosecuting attorney is not entitled to a com
mission on money collected during his term of office on a judgment rendered
during the term of his predecessor on a forfeited bail-bond or recognizance.43
6. Expenses. An officer is not entitled to reimbursement for expenses, unless
provided by law.44 Generally, however, provision is made for their allow
Compromises. —Although by statute no com
missions are allowed on moneys paid on a
compromise, yet if it was effected largely
through the efforts of the prosecuting attor
ney, and the money was paid into the county
treasury in order to deprive him of his fees,
he may collect the same from the county.
Herrington v. Santa Clara Countv, 44 Cal.
496.
If the state attorney is not to receive any
commission in excess of a certain amount, in
cluding his salary; and after receiving that
amount in one year, judgment is rendered for
certain fines and forfeitures, which, however,
are not paid until after the commencement
of the second year, he is entitled to his com
missions thereon. Hager v. Franklin, 119
Kv. S42, 81 S. W. 920. 84 S. W. 541, 26 Kv.
L.'Rep. 94, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 189.
37. Donelson v. Howard County, 23 Kan.
70.
38. Madison Countv P. Wood, 126 Ind. 168,
25 X. E. 190; Wood'r. Madison Countv, 125
Ind. 270, 25 X. E. 188.
39. Power i>. Fleming Countv, 99 Kv. 200,
35 S. W. 541, 18 Kv. L. Rep. 6*1. Contra, Ab
bott i'. Louisville, 'l4 S. W. 540, 13 Ky. L.
Rep. 87; Fears v. Ellis Countv, 20 Tex. Civ.
App. 159, 49 S. W. 139.
40. Com. v. Spraggins, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.)
512; Routt v. Feemster, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.)
131; State v. Dvches, 28 Tex. 535; Smith v.
State, 26 Tex. App. 49, 9 S. W. 274.
Respite of a part of the fine leaves the at
torney entitled to his commission on the
whole, although such commission amount to
the whole of the residue. Frazier V. Com., 12
B. Mon. (Ky.) 369.
If the governor be prohibited from remit
ting the fees of public officers, the remission
of a fine operates only upon such part as
goes ultimately to the state, but it does not
deprive the prosecuting attorney of the per
centage of the whole to which he is entitled.
Berrv v. Sheehan, 87 Ky. 434, 9 S. W. 286,
10 Ky. L. Rep. 426.
41." Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 26 La.
Ann. 20. It is not essential, however, that
there be an action in debt; it is sufficient if
the judgment is substantially a money recov
ery; as, mandamus compelling state officers
to pay monev into the countv treasurv.
Higby v. Calaveras Countv, 18 Cal. 176; Ter-
ritorv v. Cascade Countv, 8 Mont. 396, 20
Pac.*809, 7 L. R. A. 105'.
"Bonds and recognizances." — Commissions
on moneys collected on forfeited "bonds and
recognizances
" are not due out of moneys
collected on official bonds, the statute plainly
referring only to such securities as district
attorneys have to deal with in the perform
ance of their official duties, namely, appear
ance bonds and recognizances. Miller v.
State, 69 Misc. 112, 12 So. 265.
" Fines, penalties, or forfeitures," etc.—
Nor are actions on official bonds " actions
for the recovery of fines, penalties, or for
feitures," on the collection of which the dis
trict attorney is entitled to a percentage. In
re Ison, 6 Oreg. 469 ; In re Ison. 6 Orcg. 465.
These words apply only to moneys collected
under the penal code. State i\ Moore, 57
Tex. 307. They include all penalties for the
violation of law. People v. Xedrow. 122 III.
363, 13 N. E. 533 [affirming 25 111. App.
28].
Successful defense of an injunction suit
against a sheriff and county treasurer to en
join the collection of taxes is not a " collec
tion for the state or county" (Johnson
County Com'rs v. Ogg, 13 Kan. 198) ; nor is
the defense of an injunction suit brought by a
delinquent sheriff to stay an execution issued
against himself (Scarborough t>. Stevens, 3
Rob. (La.) 147).
42. State v. Stone, 72 Ala. 185; Foute v.
New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 22; State r. Brew
ster, 44 Ohio St. 249, 6 N. E. 653.
But it is not essential that the money actu
ally pass through his hands; it is enough if
he be the efficient cause of its payment. Her
rington v. Santa Clara County, 44 Cal. 49(i;
Smith t. Linn Countv, 55 Iowa 232, 7 N. W.
510.
43. Herrn v. Sharp County, 81 Ark. 33, 98
S. W. 704, under a statute allowing "ten per
cent, of the amount on forfeited bail bonds
and recognizances." Two of the judges
dissented on the grounds that " the fee is a
perquisite of the office and a method of re
compensing the officer for his public services,
and inheres to the office and not to the
officer."
44. The services of a clerk or stenographer
are not personal expenses, and no allowance
can be made therefor to a prosecuting attor
ney who receives a salary in full for all ser
vices rendered. Humiston v. Shaffer, 145
Cal. 195, 78 Pac. 651. However, such clerk
is entitled to payment Out of a fund appro
priated for assistants, although his services
consist in making out reports, etc., for years
[III, A, 6]
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ance.15 An incumbent may recover for proper expenses paid by himself, although
incurred by his predecessor.16
7. Additional Compensation and Extra Allowance — a. In General. A prose
cuting attorney is not entitled to any extra allowance beyond the compensation
provided by law,47 although that may be inadequate, and his duties have been
increased/8 and although he has performed with ability and fidelity services
preceding the act authorizing his employ
ment. Martin r. Jefferson County, 100 Ala.
428, 14 So. 203. A district attorney is not
entitled to deduct from the fees of his office
amounts necessarily expended by him as such
district attorney for office rent, clerk hire,
etc. ; he not being required to keep an office as
are other state and county officers, and there
being no statutory provision which imposes
on the county commissioners the duty of fur
nishing an office to the district attorney as
thev are required to do for other officers.
Teller County v. Trowbridge, 42 Colo. 449, 95
Pae. 554.
45. Under statute making the county liable
for all expenses necessarily incurred by any
county officer in executing the duties of his
office, the traveling expenses of the prosecut
ing attorney in pursuit of a fugitive beyond
the limits of the United States has been held
a proper item. People r. Columbia County,
134 X. Y. 1, 31 X. E. 322 [affirming 56 Hun
17, 8 X. Y. Suppl. 752 (reversing 2 X. Y.
Suppl. 351)]. See also Terrell v. Trimble,
108 S. W. 848, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 304. But
N. Y. Laws (1802), c. 086 (County Law),
making " all expenses necessarily incurred by
the district attorney" in the discharge of his
duty a county charge, does not authorize an
allowance to him for the expense of meals
while in his county. Matter of Pinney, 17
Misc. (X. Y.) 24. 40 X. Y. Suppl. 716.
46. People v. New York, 32 X. Y. 473.
47. Jay County v. Templer, 34 Ind. 322;
Freeman r. Henry County, 32 Mo. 446; Peo
ple v. Xeff, 121 X. Y. App. Div. 44, 105 X. Y.
Suppl. 550 [affirmed in 101 X. Y. 286, 84
X. E. 03]; People r. Xew. York, 1 Hill
(X. Y.) 362. See also People !'. Delaware
County, 108 X. Y. App. Div. 83, 95 X. Y.
Sup.pl.' 458.
In Kentucky, under St. (1903) § 126, pro
viding that each county attorney shall attend
all county and fiscal courts held in the
county, and conduct all cases and business in
such courts affecting the county's interest,
etc., section 127 requiring him, when so di
rected by the county or fiscal court, to in
stitute or defend actions and proceedings of
every character before any of the courts of
the commonwealth, sections 128, 129, 130, and
131 imposing other duties on him, and section
132 providing that he shall be allowed an
nually a reasonable salary, to be paid out of
the county levy, services rendered by the
county attorney, when directed by the county
or fiscal court, are included in his official
duties, and are covered by his annual salary
allowed by section 132, although where, by
statute, duties are imposed on him and com
pensation by way of commissions or other
wise is provided, he is entitled to such com-
pensation in addition to the salary allowed
by the fiscal court under said section. Spald
ing v. Tliornbery, 103 S. W. 291, 31 Kv. L.
Rep. 738, 108 S. W. 906, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 362.
The salary paid to a county attorney for his
services under the express provisions of said
section 132 is in full for all his official serv
ices, including those required of him expressly
by the statute and those rendered by direc
tion of the fiscal court in the prosecution and
defense of actions under section 127, and,
where the salary has been fixed by the fiscal
court, it has, under the express provisions of
Const. § 161, no power to diminish his com
pensation during the term for which he was
elcted, nor to increase it by allowing him a
commission on unpaid taxes collected by him.
Terrell v. Trimble County, 108 S. W. 848, 33
Ky. L. Rep. 304. St. ( 1903 ) § 4008, provid- •
ing that the county attorney shall prosecute
xmder the preceding sections and receive for
his services twenty-five per cent of the
amount recovered, relates solely to proceed
ings brought against delinquent taxpayers
under " preceding " sections, to recover pen
alties prescribed thereby, and does not entitle
the county attorney to any part of taxes on
omitted property collected by an auditor's
agent in a proceeding brought under succeed
ing sections 4241, 4200, 4203, providing for
the collection of taxes on omitted property,
in which the county attorney rendered pro
fessional assistance. Ringham r. Hager, 110
S. W. 240, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 278.
In Pennsylvania, under the act of May 22,
1895 (Pamphl. Laws 101), county commis
sioners are authorized to appoint a solicitor
and determine the amount of his salary, and,
when an attorney is appointed solicitor and
the salary is fixed, lie cannot claim compensa
tion for services rendered in litigation in
proceedings to condemn toll bridges, although
the commissioners agrepd that his salary
should only be for services as general coun
sel. Xelson v. Beaver County, 219 Pa. St.
320, 68 Atl. 832.
On change of venue.— Where the place of
trial of a prosecution was changed from E
county, in which an indictment had been
found", to W county, it was held that it was
the duty of the district attorney of W county
to assist in the prosecution, so that he was
not entitled to extra compensation therefor,
although he was employed therefor by the
district attorney, with "the approval of the
county judge of E county. People f. Xeff,
121 X. Y. App. Div. 44," 105 X. Y. Suppl.
559 [affirmed in 191 X. Y. 280, 84 N. E.
03].
48. State v. Shearer, 23 Xev. 70, 42 Pac.
582; People r. Xew York, 1 Hill (X. Y.)
362.
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which resulted in substantial benefit to the county.19 If the salary or fees of the
office are payable out of the count}'' treasury, a statute taxing an attorney's fee
against defendant in oertain cases does not give him extra compensation but is
intended to reimburse the county.60
b. By Contract.51 Although he is not entitled to anything for services not
required by law, yet the prosecuting or district attorney may make a valid con
tract with the county for such services to be rendered in another county -than
his own,62 or in another state,5* or in the federal court where the services are not
within his duties,54 or beyond his term of office,55 or otherwise not within the
scope of his official duties,59 and for extra compensation therefor.57 And he may
be entitled to compensation for services rendered to a school-district which are
not within the duties imposed upon him by law.58 In the absence of express
contract, such employment in good faith is legal, and the law will imply a contract
for extra compensation.59 But a contract for extra official services and extra
compensation is void under a constitutional provision that no county officer shall
in any manner be pecuniarily interested in or receive the benefit of any contract
executed by the county.00
49. McHendersOn c. Anderson County, 105
Tenn. 591, 59 S. W. 1016.
50. Com. v. Rogers, 9 Grav (Mass.) 278;
Spokane Countv t. Allen. » Wish. 229, 37
Pac. 428, 43 Am. St. Rep. 830.
51. See Officers, 29 Cyc. 1424.
52. Bevington v. Woodbury County, 107
Iowa 424, 78 N. W. 222 ; Huffman v.- Green
wood County, 23 Kan. 281; Gillett v. Lyon
County Com'rs, 18 Kan. 410 ; Leavenworth
Countv t>.Brewer, 9 Kan. 307.
53. "Slavton v. Rogers, 107 S. W. 696, 32
Ky. L. Rop. 897.
54. Nichols v. Shawnea County, 76 Kan.
266, 91 Pac. 79 (holding that a' county at
torney, directed by the county commissioners
to represent his county in litigation pending
in the United States court, may recover for
such services, although at the time the serv
ices are performed the court may be held in
the same county, and although Gen. St. (1868)
c. 136, § 25, requires a county attorney to
appear
" in the several courts of their re
spective counties " on behalf of the people in
civil or criminal cases in which their county
is interested) : Leavenworth County v. Brewer,
9 Kan. 307 (in another county) ; Slayton v.
Rogers. 107 S. W. 696, 32 Kv. L. Rep. 897.
55. Jones v. Morgan, 67 CaL 308, 7 Pac.
734.
56. Slavton v. Rogers, 107 S. W. 696, 32
Ky. L. Rep. 897.
Settlement and compromise of bonded in
debtedness. — In Kentucky the county attor
ney performing services under an appoint
ment by the fiscal court as commissioner in
the settlement and compromise of the bonded
indebtedness of the county performs services
outside of his official duties, and is entitled to
compensation therefor, notwithstanding Const.
§ 161, providing that the compensation of
any county officer shall not be changed after
his election or appointment. Slavton v.
Rogers, 107 S. W. 096. 32 Ky. L. Rep. 897.
57. See the cases cited in the preceding
notes.
Construction of contract between district
attorney and board of supervisors see People
v. Delaware Countv, 108 X. Y. App. Div. 83,
95 N. Y. Suppl. 458.
■58.Bates v. Pierce County School Dist.
No. 10, 45 Wash. 498, 88 Pac. 944, holding
that 1 Ballinger Annot. Codes & St. § 468,
requiring prosecuting attorneys to give ad
vice to all county and precinct officers and
directors and superintendents of common
schools as to their official business, and to
draw up in writing all contracts and like
instruments of an official nature, for the use
of said officers, does not require a prosecuting
attorney to appear in court and conduct
litigation on behalf of a school-district with
out compensation other than that received in
his official capacity, and having done so at
the request of the school-district, he was en
titled to reasonable compensation for such
services.
59. Huffman v. Greenwood County, 23 Kan.
281 ; Bates v. Pierce Countv School Dist. Xo.
10, 45 Wash. 498, 88 Pac. 944.
He is not entitled to additional compensa
tion for consultation and advice within his
district concerning the removal of cases to
another county (Huffman
' r. Greenwood
County, 25 Kan. 64) ; nor for attending to a
suit in another county to which his own
county was a party, it being his statutory
duty to appear for his county in all suits to
which it is a party (Hennepin County c.
Robinson, 16 Minn. 381).
Amount of compensation. — In an action by
a prosecuting attorney against a school-dis
trict for services, where the agreed statement
of facts showed that the attorney submitted
a bill for one hundred and fifty dollars for
his services, and where it did not appear that
such bill was an offer of compromise or a
mere attempt to settle a disputed olaim. it
was held that a finding for plaintiff in an
amount exceeding one hundred and fifty dol
lars was erroneous. Bates v. Pierce Countv
School Dist. Ao. 10, 45 Wash. 498, 88 Pac.
944.
60. Wilson f. Otoe County, 71 Nebr. 435,
98 N. W. 1050 \ overruling Shepard v. Kast-
erling, 61 Xebr. 882, 86 X. W. 941.]
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e. Fees in Addition to Salary. A constitution or statute fixing a salary in full
payment for all services abolishes all fees pertaining to the office.*1 But unless
it is clear that the salary is in lieu of other compensation, the fees provided for
prosecuting certain cases may still be allowed.63 Prosecuting attorneys cannot
be allowed anything for the payment of deputies, clerks, etc., if their salaries are
declared by law to be in full for all services rendered.83
8. Liability of State, County, City, and Private Citizens. The liability of the
state, county, or city to pay the salary or other compensation of prosecuting
attorneys depends upon the constitution and statutes of the state.64 The prose
cuting attorney's fee is a part of the cost of a criminal proceeding; * and under
61. Kern County v. Fay, 131 Cal. 547, 63
Pac. 857. See Cook County v. Healy. 222 111.
310, 78 N. E. 023; People V. Xeff, 121 X. Y.
App. Div. 44, 105 X. Y. Suppl. 559 [a/firmed
in 191 N. Y. 286, 84 X. E. 63]; People v.
Queens County, 1 Hill (X. Y.) 302.
In Illinois it has been held that, in view of
the uncertainty of the language of Const,
art. 6, § 25, and the practical construction
given thereto by the various acts of the legis
lature in permitting state's attorneys to re
tain fees in addition to the salary paid by the
state and county, such provision will not be
held to restrict the compensation of state's
attorneys to the salary paid to them by the
state and county or to require them to pay
over to the county all fees collected by them
in excess of such salary. Cook County v.
Healy. 222 111. 310, 78 X'.E. 623.
Under Mo. Rev. St. (1899) § 4949. providing
that the prosecuting attorney shall receive
for his services a certain salary and shall
also receive such fees as are allowed by law,
he is entitled to additional fees only where
thev are expressly allowed him by statute.
Hill v. Butler County, 195 Mo. 511,' 94 S. W.
518.
Classification of counties by population see
Lewis v. Lackawanna County, 200 Pa. St.
590, 50 Atl. 102 [reversing' 17 Pa. Super.
Ct. 25].
In divorce suits.— Hill Annot. Laws Oreg.
§ 1074. requiring plaintiff in a divorce suit
to deposit ten dollars with the clerk of court,
to be paid the district attorney as his fee, is
repealed, except as to the fourth judicial dis
trict, where the fee is continued in force for
the benefit of the county, by Sess. Laws
(1898), p. 7, § S, and by Sess.'Laws (1899),
p. 184. which by section 3 provides that no
compensation shall be paid the district at
torney except his salary, and by section 5
repeals all acts in conflict therewith. Howard
r. Clatsop County. 41 Oreg. 149. 08 Pac. 425.
Collection of taxes for contingent fee.—
Under Ky. St. (1903) § 126, providing that
each county attorney shall attend all county
and fiscal courts held in the county and con
duct nil cases and business in such courts
affecting the county's interest, etc., section
127 requiring him to represent the county
and commonwealth in all cases in which they
are interested, and. when directed by the
fiscal court, to institute proceedings before it,
and section 132 providing that the county
attorney shall be allowed annually a reason
able salary, to be paid out of the county
levy, the fiscal court haB no power to appoint
the county attorney back-tax collector, and to
require him to collect such taxes for a con
tingent fee. Spalding v. Thornbury, 103 S. W.
291, 31 Kv. L. Rep. 738.
62. Pillsbury v. Brown, 45 Cal. 46 ; Farr v.
Seaward, 82 Iowa 221, 48 X. W. 07; Xolan
v. Ellis County, 05 Kan. 57, 08 Pac. 1068.
County attorneys are not required by the pro
visions of Kan. Laws (1899), c. 141 (Gen.
St. (1901) c. 39), to account to the county
for any fees collected by them under the pro
visions of the prohibitory law (Laws (1885),
c. 149, I 10, Gen. St. (1901) § 2475). Xolan
v. Ellis County, supra.
63. Humiston v. Shaffer, 145 Cal. 195, 78
Pac. 651.
64. See State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 29, 3 So.
433; Cropsey v. Henderson, 63 Ind. 268.
Police courts.— In Fleming v. Hance, 153
Cal. 162, 94 Pac. 020, a statute providing
for prosecuting attorneys for police courts,
and imposing upon the city the obligation to
pay their salary, was held unconstitutional.
In Alabama the solicitor's fee in a criminal
case is payable by the state, although execu
tion against defendant has not been returned
" Xo property found," since Code (1890),
§ 4570, providing that sheriff's fees in a
criminal case shall be paid by the state where
an execution against either the defendant on
conviction or the prosecutor on acquittal is
returned " Xo property found," does not
apply to a solicitor's fee. Trapp V. State,
120 Ala. 397, 24 So. 1001.
In Florida, under Gen. St. (1906) § 3878,
the prosecuting attorney is entitled to a con
viction fee of five dollars for each misde
meanor, to be paid by the proper county when
defendant is insolvent or discharged, as pre
scribed by law. State v. McMillan, 55 Fla.
254. 45 So. 882. And section 3266, providing
that every person convicted of carrying con
cealed weapons shall pay a conviction fee of
ten dollars to be taxed as costs, fixes a fee
unconstitutional as against the convicted per
son, whether solvent or insolvent, and a pro
viso exempting the counties from liability
when the convicted person is insolvent is in
conflict with the constitutional provision
that, when defendant is insolvent, the costs
and expenses shall be paid by the county.
State r. McMillan, supra.
65. See supra, III, A, 2.
Civil action.— Xot so his fee for represent
ing the state in civil actions. Davis v. State,
33 Ga. 531.
[III, A, 7, e]
PROSECUTING AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS [32 Cyc] 705
a statute providing that upon failure of the defendant against whom judgment is
rendered to pay the costs, the county shall be liable for the same, it is liable for
his fees." A statutory fee of a percentage of certain fines, etc., gives the prose
cuting attorney a vested interest therein. If wholly remitted, he is not entitled
to have such fee taxed against the defendant as costs, but he must look to the state
or county for payment thereof; otherwise, the remission relieves the defendant
only of that portion which would go to the state or county, and the attorney may
recover his percentage from the defendant.67 A statute requiring the county
attorney's per diem to be paid by the state is void, where the constitution directs
that county officers receiving stated salaries shall be paid by the county, a per
diem being a stated salary.68 A mere request by private citizens that proceedings
be instituted against the accused, does not raise an implied contract to pay there
for, the attorney being charged by law with the duty of such prosecution.69 Fees
fixed by law are not to be taxed against defendants unless it is so provided,
but they are to be paid by the state or county.70
9. Allowance and Collection — a. Allowance.71 The allowance of com
pensation by a judge or county board having statutory authority to fix the amount
is a judicial act.72 Hence it. must be evidenced by an order entered on the author
ity of the judge or board and purporting to be so.73 The amount which should
be allowed is a question of fact to be tried on evidence by the court which is to
66. Phillips County r. Clayton, 29 Ark. 246.
An agreement by the defendant, in con
sideration of dismissal of the proceeding, to
pay costs as upon conviction, is contrary to
public policy; and in such case, if the costs
cannot be made out of the defendant, the
county is not liable. State v. Xarramore, 52
Mo. 27.
Upon a change of venue the county in which
the indictment was found is liable for the
costs of prosecution, including the prosecuting
attorney s fees, notwithstanding he is an offi
cer of the county to which the cause was re
moved. Bevington v. Woodbury County. 107
Iowa 424. 78 N. W. 222 ; State V. Whitworth,
20 Mont. 107, 66 Pac. 748; Gandy r. 8tate,
27 Nebr. 707, 43 N. W. 747, 44 N. W. 108.
67. Berry v. Sheehan, 87 Ky. 434, 9 S. W.
286. 9 Kv. L. Rep. 426; Dewey r. Com., 7
P.. Mon. (*Ky.) 78.
The prosecuting attorney of a special court
is not entitled to the salary or fees allowed
regular prosecuting attorneys out of the state
treasury, the statute providing that he shall
be paid by the county. Cropsev v. Henderson,
63 Ind. 268: Moore b. Roberts.* 87 N. C. 11.
68. State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 29. 3 So. 433.
69. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Lee. 37 Ohio
St. 479.
70. Com. p. Shanks. 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 304.
Docket fees not mentioned in the statute
providing for taxation of costs and fees
against the defendant, are not taxable against
him. Jewett r. Talbott, 11 Ind. 298.
Payment out of convict fund.— Under Ala.
Acts (1896-1897), p. 1532, providing that, on
convictions for which penitentiary sentences
are imposed, the clerk shall certify the bill of
costs, including the solicitor's fee, to the
president of the board of convict inspectors,
who shall request the auditor to draw a
warrant for its payment out of the convict
fund, the solicitor's fee is payable out of the
convict fund, and it is the duty of said presi-
dent to request the drawing of such warrant.
Trapp v. State, 117 Ala. 227, 23 So. 829,
Divorce cases.— A statute fixing a salary
in addition to fees already provided, excepting
only those allowed for services on behalf of
the state or county, does not abolish the fee
to be paid by the plaintiff in divorce suits,
the exception being intended to apply only to
such fees as were formerly paid by the state.
State v. Moore. 37 Oreg. 536, 62 Pae. 26.
71. Compensation and fees of deputies, as
sistants, and substitutes see infra, VI, F, 3.
72. Baltimore v. Baltimore County Com'rs,
19 Md. 554; Meador v. Texas County. 107 Mo.
201, 66 S. W. 944; Onondaga c.'Briggs, 2
Den. (N. Y.) 20.
Definiteness of claim.— A claim by a dis
trict attorney for " car fares and other in
cidental expenses necessarily incurred by S.,
stenographer," and for " traveling and other
expenses necessarily incurred in " a certain
case, is not sufficiently definite to justify its
allowance by the board of supervisors. Mat
ter of Pinnev, 17 Misc. (X. Y.) 24, 40
'
N. Y.
Suppl. 716.
"
Warrant for fees.— Where a warrant for
fees of a district attorney covers some items
improperly allowed, the remainder being un
disputed, it is proper for the county judge to
refuse to issue a new warrant for the correct
items unless the previous warrant is surren
dered. Donaldson v. Walker, 101 Tenn. 236,
47 S. W. 417. The issuance by the county
judge of a warrant for district attorney's
fees inadvertently or erroneously does not
preclude him, as financial agent of the county,
from forbidding its payment until it can be
purged of illegal and unauthorized items.
Donaldson r. Walker, supra.
73. Baltimore r. Baltimore County Com'rs,
19 Md. 554, holding that mere taxation by
the clerk of a prosecuting attorney's fee as
costs is not sufficient evidence of its allow
ance by the court.
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pass judgment on the claim when presented, of which neither the attorney nor
the county court in its administrative capacity is the judge ; 74 and the order of
allowance cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding.75 Mandamus will lie
to enforce the exercise of the discretion to allow attorney's fees, but not to correct
an allowance.70 If the law requires solicitor's charges certified by the judge to
be audited before allowance by the county board,77 or if the board has by law
exclusive control of all county expenditures,78 the amount lies within the discre
tion of the board and it is not controlled by the certificate of the judge. The
solicitor cannot appeal from an order allowing his fee and taxing it as costs, in a
case in which the state has no right of appeal.79
b. Collection. The district or prosecuting attorney cannot be required to
wait until fees payable out of the state treasury " on conviction " are collected by
the state from the defendant.80 But if due from the state only in case of the insol
vency of the defendant, he is not entitled to payment until after sentence of con
viction, the failure of the defendant to pay, and return by the sheriff " no property
found." 81 Not being entitled to fees allowed by law, except for services actually
performed,82 the payment of warrants issued on account of commissions due a
prosecuting attorney pro tern, may be resisted on the ground that the services
were not rendered.83
c. Lien or Charge on Fund or Judgment. Prosecuting or district attorneys
have no lien for their fees on judgments in behalf of the state or county, nor upon
public funds of any kind,84 unless expressly conferred by law. But if made payable
out of a certain fund they become a charge thereon as soon as ascertained or fixed,45
and the attorney may retain the same out of any such funds in his hands before
paying over the balance.88 They cannot be collected or retained out of any other
funds than those provided by law.87 Commissions on judgments for fines and
forfeitures, being fixed by statute, give a vested interest in the judgment itself, and
74. Meador p. Texas Countv, 1C7 Mo. 201,
6G S. W. 944.
75. Onondaga v. Briggs, 2 Den. (X. Y.)
20.
76. People v. Fulton County, 14 Barb.
(X. Y.) 52; People v. New York, 1 Hill
(X. Y.) 362.
77. People v. Fulton County, 14 Barb.
(X. Y.) 52.
78. State v. Bonebrake, 4 Kan. 247.
79. State v. Tyler, 85 X. C. 569.
When he has the right of appeal from an
order denying claims in excess of a certain
amount, the appeal lies in the case of a claim
for " reasonable salary," without specifying
the amount; but if upon the trial the proof
shows a reasonable salary to be less than
such sum, the appeal should be dismissed.
Gudgell v. Bath County Ct., 8 Ky. L. Rep.
677. 1 Ky. L. Rep. 336.
80. Trapp v. State, 122 Ala. 394, 25 So.
194, 120 Ala. 397, 24 So. 1001; Purifoy f.
Godfrey, 105 Ala. 142, 16 So. 701.
Presentment to the county board is not
necessary, the claim being for fees paid by
defendant to the clerk and by him errone
ously turned over to the county, the law
requiring presentment and demand only of
unliquidated claims. Farr v. Seaward, 82
Iowa 221, 48 X. W. 67.
Statute of limitations. —A district attor
ney's claim for money collected by him for
the state is an " action upon a liability cre
ated by statute, other than a penalty or for
feiture," and is barred by the period of lim-
Station prescribed in such case. Iligby t'.
Calaveras Countv, 18 Cal. 176.
81. State V, Barnes, 24 Fla, 153, 4 So.
5G0.
82. See supra, III, A, 1.
83. O'Connor v. East Baton Rouge Parish,
31 La. Ann. 221.
But payment of salary cannot be denied
on the ground that he was inefficient or with
out learning. O'Connor v. East Baton Rouge
Parish, 31 La. Ann. 221.
84. Wood r. State, 125 Ind. 219, 25 X. E.
190; Woodward v. Gregg, 3 Greene (Iowa)
287
85. Peeples v. Walker, 12 Ga. 353.
86. Buckingham P. People, 26 111. App.
269.
Under a statute making insolvent costs
due prosecuting attorneys payable out of
funds arising from fines, etc., the lien at
taches to all such already collected as have
not been previously appropriated. Pittuian
v. Glenn, 61 Ga. 376.
87. The prosecuting attorney cannot de
duct his compensation out of funds which
should have been previously paid over to
the state or countv. Chadwick v. People,
206 111. 122, 68 X.' E. 1108 [affiiming 108
111. App. 620]. Xor can they be paid out of
funds collected from taxes for the previous
year, the legislature having declared void
all contracts made by the county to pay
salaries in excess of its annual income. Ter
ritory t\ Bernalillo Countv, (X. M. 1905)
79 Pac. 709.
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the prosecuting attorney has the same right as the state to collect his part of the
judgment in any manner provided by law."
10. Conflicting Claims 80— a. Between Incumbent and Predecessor. He who
actually renders the particular service for which the fee is allowed is entitled to the
same.90 If the fee is for " conviction, " etc., the attorney in office when the defend
ant is actually convicted is entitled to receive the commission, although his prede
cessor instituted the action," and although he prosecuted it to a judgment which
was pending on appeal when his term expired.92 Money deposited in lieu of bail
becomes the property of the state immediately upon forfeiture; and therefore the
attorney then in office is entitled to the commission thereon, and not his successor
who took formal judgment against the depositors.03 A statute providing for an
equal division of fees in certain suits instituted by one county attorney and prose
cuted to final judgment by his successor applies to actions pending at the time of
the passage of the act, and it is not for that reason obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition of retroactive legislation.04 If the commission is for the entire services
in connection with the suit, the outgoing attorney should receive a ratable pro
portion.9* An act providing that solicitors, for insolvent costs due them, may
retain the amount thereof out of any funds collected by them for the state or
county, requires payment to each officer in the order of priority.00
b. Between Superior and Inferior Officers. It is equally true of solicitor-
generals and county solicitors that he who actually renders the service is entitled
to the fee.97 There being but one fee provided for conviction, if a conviction is
obtained by an attorney for the commonwealth in a trial before a magistrate, and
is affirmed upon appeal to the circuit court by the district attorney, he who first
secured the conviction has the fee, although if the appeal had resulted in acquittal,
neither would have earned the same.98
e. Between Incumbent De Facto and Rightful Officer. Salary being an incident
of the office, not dependent upon services rendered, the attorney having legal title
88. Berry v. Sheehan, 87 Kv. 434, 9 S. W. to the exclusion of the incumbent. Peeples
2S6. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 426. t\ Walker, 12 Ga. 353. But the only discrim-
89. Between prosecuting attorney and at- ination made by this act is between solicitors.
torney pro tem see infra, VI, F, 2. As to costs due a clerk of the court, the so-
Deductions see supra, III, A, 4. licitor having in hand a fund from the col-
Division of fees see infra, VI, F, 2. lection of fines is entitled to retain his own
90. Vastine v. Voullaire, 45 Mo. 504, hold- costs first, only in the event he holds the
ini^ that where the former circuit attorney oldest lien. Brown r. Bleckley, 26 Ga. 328.
drew up certain indictments and performed If after paying his immediate predecessor he
all the services which were rendered, the is required to pay the balance to the county
cases having been continued but not brought treasurer, former solicitors cannot require
to trial by his successor, the former is en- payment from him, but must look to the
titled to the fees accrued. county for payment of their fees out cf
91. Ashlock p. Com., 7 B. Hon. (Kv.) 44. such "excess. Bartlett V. Brunson, 115 Ga.
92. Flint v. Jones County, 20 Tex. Civ. 459. 41 S. E. 001.
App. 641, 50 S. W. 203. 97. Thomas v. Thomas, 61 Ga. 70, holding
93. Arnsparger v. Norman, 101 Ky. 208, 40 that if the solicitor -general draws indict-
S. W. 574, 79 Ky. L. Rep. 381. ments which are found in the superior court,
Collection on
'
bail-bond forfeited during but afterward transferred to the county
term of predecessor see Herrn r. Sharp court and there tried, he, and not the county
Countv, 81 Ark. 33, 98 S. W. 704, referred to attorney who tries them, is entitled to the
supra', III, A, 5, note 43. fees allowed for drawing indictments.
94. Swayne v. Terrell, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 98. Com. v. Rogers, 9 Gray (Mass.) 278.
31. 48 S. W. 218. Bail-bond. — The county attorney who ap-
95. Cole v. McKune, 19 Cal. 422. peared in the examining'court and succeeded
96. Hackett v. Jones, 2 Ga. 282. Under in having the accused bound over, and ad-
a later act making the insolvent costs of the mitted to bail, is entitled to share the com-
incumbent who brings the fund into court monwealth attorney's fee on forfeiture of the
first payable, and then the costs of former bond in the circuit court, although the bond
solicitors, it was held that the legislature was taken by the county judge after adjourn-
could not divest the rights of former solici- ment of the examining court. It is neverthe-
tors; and the law, therefore, as to their ac- less a "bail-bond taken by the examining
counts allowed before the passage of the act, court" within the statute. Day t>. Brooks,, 8
remained as it was, and they must be paid Ky. L. Rep. 429.
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to the office is
,
in the absence of a statute, entitled to the salary to the exclusion
of the de facto incumbent.9"
B. Of United States District Attorneys — 1. Salary.1 Since July 1, 1896,
the district attorneys of the United States have been allowed an annual salary,
varying in amount in the different districts, in full compensation for all official
services performed by them, including services in the circuit courts of appeal for
their respective districts, wherever sitting. These salaries are in lieu of all fees,
commissions, etc., formerly allowed.3
2. Expenses. By the act of congress of 1896 it is provided that the necessary
office expenses of the district attorneys shall be allowed when authorized by the
attorney-general.3 Clerk hire is not allowed as an office expense, but the district
attorney may be allowed a clerk, with the approval of the attorney-general, at a
salary to be fixed by the latter.4 It is also provided that the necessary .expenses
for lodging and subsistence actually paid, not exceeding four dollars per day, and
actual and necessary traveling expenses of the district attorney and his, assistants,
while absent from their respective official residences and necessarily employed in
going to, returning from, and attending before any United States, court, com
missioner, or other committing magistrate, and while necessarily absent from their
respective official residences on official business, shall be allowed and paid in the
manner provided by the statute.5
99. People v. Smyth, 28 Cal. 21. Sec Of
ficers, 29 Cyc. 1393.
Payment of the salary to such incumbent,
who has performed substantial services, does
not deprive the legal officer of his right to
same. People v. Smyth, 28 Cal. 21.
1. Assistants to United States district at
torneys see infra, VI, F, 5.
2. Act Cong. May 28, 1890, c. 252, 8§ 6
,
7
.
This act does not apply to the district at
torney for the southern district of New York,
who receives a salary of six thousand dollars
per annum under U. S. Rev. St. (1878)
S 770 [U. S. Comp. St. (1901) p. 600]. Act
Cong. May 28, 1896, c. 252, f 24.
Prior to this act their compensation con
sisted of docket fees, per diems, commissions,
etc., taxed as costs, not to exceed six thou
sand dollars per annum (U. S. Rev. St.
(1878) §S 824-827, 835. and 838 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) pp. 632-634]). exclusive
of allowances to be made in prize cases (§§
836 and 4647) and of the commission on mon
eys collected under the revenue laws under
section 825 and allowance for defending offi
cers of the revenue under section 827 (§§ 834
and 835).
These fees and emoluments, except those
charged against and collected from the United
States, are to be charged and collected as
formerly, and paid to the clerk of the court
having jurisdiction, and by him covered into
the treasury. Act Cong. Mav 28, 1896, c.
252, § 6
.
3. Act Cong. Mav 28. 1806, c. 252. $ 14.
4. Act Cong. Mav 28. 1800. c. 252, §§ 15, 16.
5. Act Cong. May 28, 1896, c. 252, § 8.
When authorized by the attorney-general,
the expenses of travel and subsistence of a
clerk to a district attorney while attending
with the attorney a term of court held at a
place other than that of the official residence
of the attorney, are properly payable as a
necessary part of the district attorney's
office. 3 Comp. Dec. 253. Expenses for lodg
ing and subsistence must not exceed four
dollars for any one day. If they amount to
less than four dollars for one day, and more
than four dollars on the succeeding day, the
expenses cannot be averaged so as to charge
eight dollars for the two days. 4 Comp. Dec.
41*8.
The expense of a berth in a sleeping car
will be allowed as a traveling expense, and
not as expense for lodging. 3 Comp. Dec.
386.
Verifying account. —A district attorney or
assistant is not entitled to reimbursement
for the necessary expenses incurred in verify
ing his account. 4 Comp. Dec. 494 ; 3 Comp.
Dec. 646.
Prior to the act of 1896 the dislrict attor
ney was allowed a mileage of ten cents per
mile for traveling from his place of abode to
the place of holding any court, examination
before a commissioner, etc., and ten cents per
mile for returning, in lieu of all traveling
expenses. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 824
[U. S. Comp. St. (1901) p. 632]. Under this
section it was held that, where there was no
adjournment of court for any judicial day, but
only from Saturday to Monday, the district
attorney was not entitled to mileage for go
ing to and returning from his home during
the adjournment over Sundav. U. S. P.
Shields, 153 U. S. 86. 14 S. Ct. 735, 38 L.
ed. C45; Baxter «. U. S., 51 Fed. 671, 2
C. C. A. 411. But if the court adjourned
over one or more judicial days, it was al
lowed. Baxter r. U. S., supra. Mileage was
also held allowable, although charged for at
tending upon successive days before the same
commissioner, unless the necessity for his
presence on the next day was known to the
district attorney before departure. U. S.
v. Colman, 76 Fed. 214, 22 C. C. A. 136. He
was entitled to mileage for traveling by the
most convenient and practical routes in the
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3. Extra Allowance. Extra compensation cannot be allowed a United States
district attorney for any service performed, in the* course of his official employment,*
nor can any allowance or compensation be made for any extra service whatever,
although required by the department of justice, unless expressly authorized by
law.7
4. Allowance and Collection. Salaries are paid monthly by the department
of justice.8 Accounts showing all disbursements on account of lodging, subsistence,
and traveling expenses, provided in the act, must be made out quarterly and sub
mitted to the circuit or district court of the district.' Said accounts, together
with the vouchers and items thereof, made out in duplicate, shall be proven in
open court by the district attorney, by his oath or that of some other person having
knowledge of the facts, to be attached to such accounts, that the disbursements so
charged have been fully paid in lawful money; and the court shall thereupon cause
to be entered of record an order approving or disapproving the account.10 When
approved, the clerk of said court shall forward the originals to the attorney-general
for examination under his supervision.11 They shall then be sent to the proper
accounting officers of the treasury department, where they shall be subject to
revision upon their merits, as in case of other public accounts.12
5. Demand or Receipt of Other Compensation. To accept, receive, or
demand any fee or other compensation for the performance of an official service,
other than the salary provided by law, or to fail to account for any fee received,
is an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, at the discretion of the
court.13 Any fees or ei.tra compensation so received may be treated by the govern
ment as moneys in the hands of the district attorney belonging to it.u
discharge of his official duties, although these
may not have been the shortest routes. U. S.
V. Perry, 50 Fed. 743, 1 C. C. A. 648. An
allowance for travel and mileage was not to
be regarded as part of the attorney's com
pensation, but rather as reimbursement for
expenses. U. S. v. Smith, 158 U. S. 346, 15
S. Ct. 846, 39 L. ed. 1011.
6. Instructions to U. S. District Attorneys,
April 1. 1907, « 1037; Gibson v. Peters, 150
U. S. 342, 14 S. Ct. 134, 37 L. ed. 1104;
Sill v. U. S., 87 Fed. 099, 31 C. C. A. 200;
U. S. v. Fleming. 80 Fed. 372. 25 C. C. A.
498; U. S. V. Ady, 76 Fed. 359, 22 C. C. A.
223.
Prize cases.— It has been held that the com
pensation allowed by U. S. Rev. St. (1878)
I 4646 [U. S. Com p. St. (1901) p. 3138], in
prize cases, viz., " a just and suitable com
pensation ... to be adjusted and determined
by the court," is still to be allowed, in addi
tion to the annual salary provided by the
act of 1896; that said act does not repeal
said section 4046, and the district attorney is
not required to pay the allowance so made
him, into the treasury; his services in such
cases being in the nature of special services,
on behalf both of the government, and officer*
and men of the navy entitled to share in the
proceeds of the capture. The Adula, 127 Fed.
853.
7. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 1764 [V. S.
Com p. St. (1901) p. 1200]. And see Colman
r. I". S., 66 Fed. li!>5, 14 C. C. A. 65.
Assistant district attorney see infra, VI,
F 5
8. Act Cong. Mav 28. 1890, e. 252, g 16.
9. Act Cong. Mav 28, 1890, c. 252, S 13.
10. 18 U. S. St. at L. 333, c. 95, § 1 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 648].
11. 28 U. S. St. at L. 210, c. 174, 8 11
[U. S. Comp. St. (1901) p. 166].
12. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 846 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 647].
The approval or dismissal by the court of
such accounts, under the act of 1875, is not
a judicial act, but merely a step in the ex
ecutive business of settling accounts. Waters
v. V. S., 21 Ct. CI. 30 [affirmed in 133 U. S.
208, 10 S. Ct. 249, 33 L. ed. 594]. It is,
however, prima facie evidence of the correct
ness or incorrectness of the account, and, in
the absence of clear and unequivocal proof of
mistake on the part of the court, it should
be conclusive. U. S. t'. Jones, 134 U. S.
483, 10 S. Ct. 615, 33 L. ed. 1007.
Presentation to the accounting officers of
the treasury is not a condition precedent to
the right of recovery, said .officers having pre
viously disallowed similar items; nor will re
jection of a claim bar an action thereon.
Van Hoorebeke c. U. S., 46 Fed. 456 ; Erwin
v. U. S., 37 Fed. 470, 2 L. R. A. 229;
Ravesies v. U. S., 21 Ct. CI. 243.
Where accounts have been duly approved
by the court and passed by the proper ac
counting officers of the treasury, they cannot
afterward be impeached except for fraud or
palpable mistake. U. S. v. Tuthill. 136 V. S.
052, 10 S. Ct. 1075, 34 L. ed. 557.
A district attorney is not entitled to inter
est on his accounts for the period intervening
between the time of their allowance by the
treasury department, and the time of their
payment. Baxter V. V. S., 51 Fed. 671. 2
C. C. A. 411.
13. 29 U. S. St. at L. 183, c. 252, IS 18
[U. S. Comp. St. (1901) p. 6171.
14. Bliss p. U. S., 37 Fed. 191 [affirmed
in 38 Fed. 230].
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IV. Powers and Duties.1'
A. Representation of United States, State, or County — l. united
States. District attorneys of the United States are charged with the duty of prose
cuting, in their respective districts, all delinquents for crimes and offenses cognizable
under the authority of the United States, and all- civil actior.s in which the United
States are concerned.16 It is also their duty to conduct all suits and proceedings
arising out of the provisions of law governing national banking associations, in
which the United States or any of its officers or agents are parties; 17 and all suits
or proceedings pending in their district against collectors, or other officers of the
revenue, for any act done by them, or for the recovery of money exacted by or
paid to such officers and by them paid into the treasury; 1S and, on request of the
secretary of the treasury, to defend any action brought against any officer of either
house of congress on account of anything done by him in the discharge of his
official duties in executing any order of such house.19 All legal services connected
with the procurement of titles to sites for public buildings, other than life-saving
stations and pier-head lights, are required to be rendered by United States district
attorneys.20
2. State and County — a. In General. It is the duty, and the right and
privilege as well, of the prosecuting attorney for the state or territory,21 generally
to conduct prosecutions in the courts of his district, for crimes and offenses com
mitted therein; also to represent the state, and the counties within his district, in
the prosecution or defense of all civil actions in such courts in which either may be
a party or interested.22 It is his duty to appear for the state or county, notwith-
15. Of deputies, assistants, and substitutes
see infra, VI, E.
16. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 771 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 601].
Circuit courts of appeal. — Under the act of
March 3, 1891, establishing these courts, it
was held not the duty of the district attor
neys to appear therein for the United States.
U. S. r. Garter, 170 U. S. 527. IS S. Ct. 703,
42 L. ed. 1133; U. S. v. Winston, 170 U. S.
522, 18 S. Ct. 701, 42 L ed. 1130; Garter !\
U. S., 31 Ct. CI. 344. But such is now their
duty under the act of Mav 28, 1896, c. 252,
8 ti (29 I'. S. St. at L. 179 [U S. Comp. St.
(1901) p. 011]).
Civii actions.— A suit to condemn lands for
public buildings is a "civil action in which
the United State3 are concerned" (U. S. V.
Johnson, 173 U. 'S. 363, 19 S. Ct. 427, 43
L. ed. 731 ) ; and so is the defense of a habeas
corpus proceeding brought to release Chinese
immigrants detained by order of the collector
of the port (Hilborn V. U. S., 163 U. S. 342,
16 S. Ct. 1017, 41 L. ed. 183 [affirming 28
Ct. CI. 237]); a suit to recover pensions
fraudulently received (Ruhm r. U. S., 66
Fed. 531) ; and an action to enforce a statu
tory lien for unpaid revenue taxes (Bliss v.
U.S., 37 Fed. 191 [affirmed in 38 Fed. 230]).
The prosecution of Chinese persons found
in his district unlawfully within the United
States under the exclusion acts Is also a
part of the duty of the district attorney
under section 771. Chin Ying r. U. S., 188
U. S. 202, 22 S. Ct. 895. 46 L. ed. 1128;
Chin Bak Kan p. U. S., 180 U. S. 193, 22
S. Ct. 891, 46 L. ed. 1121.
District of Columbia.— Violations of all
laws of the United States applicable to the
district are to be prosecuted by the district
attorney of the United States; but violations
of municipal ordinances therein are to be
prosecuted by the attorney for the district.
U. S. T. Hoskins, 5 Mackev 478.
17. U. S. Rev. St. (18*78) § 380 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 213].
Suits brought by receivers of national banks
for the collection of assets and to wind up
their affairs fall within this provision.
Gibson v. Peters. 150 U. S. 342, 14 S. Ct.
134, 37 L. ed. 1104 [affirming 36 Fed. 487
(overruling 35 Fed. 721)].
18. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) g 771 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 601].
19. 18 U. S. St. at L. c. 130, g 8 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 602]; U. S. Rev. St.
Suppl. p. 76, § 8.
20. 25 U. S. St. at L. 941, c. 411 [U. 8.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 2518]. This includes all
examinations of such titles and opinions
thereon. Sill r. U. S., 87 Fed. 699, 31
C. C. A. 200; U. S. v. Adv. 76 Fed. 369, 22
C. C. A. 223; Ruhm r. U. S., 66 Fed. 531.
Compare Weed v. U. 6., 65 Fed. 399, 82 Fed.
414.
21. The prosecuting attorney for the terri
tory, not the XTnited States district attorney.
prosecutes cases arising under territorial
laws. People v. Heed, 1 Ida. 402; Snow v.
U. S., IS Wall. (U. S.) 317, 21 L. ed. 784.
22. Colorado.— Atchison, etc., R. Co. v.
People, 5 Colo. 60.
Idaho.— Under Act Feb. 22, 1899 (Laws
1899, p. 25). prescribing the powers and du
ties of county attorneys, it is the duty of the
prosecuting attorney to defend all applica
tions or motions in the district court of his
county in which the people of the state or the
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standing the law makes provision for the employment of other counsel in special
cases,23 and the control of the case cannot be taken from him and given to those so
employed.24 He must represent the state whether nominally plaintiff or defend
ant.23 He is not prohibited from representing private litigants where he owes no
duty to the state.28 If his official duties are prescribed by the constitution, they
county i8 interested or a party. Twin Falls
County e. Bassett, 14 Ida. 324, 93 Pac. 774.
loxca.— Lewis v. Lyon County, 3S Iowa
695; Clark v. Lyon County, 37 Iowa 469.
Kentucky. — Daviess County v. Daviess
County Gravel Road Co., 63 S. W. 752, 23
Ky. L. Rep. 711.
Michigan. — People p. Brady, 90 Mich. 459,
51 X. W. 537.
Nebraska.— Dinsmore v. State, 61 Xebr.
418, 85 X. W. 445.
Oklahoma.— Logan County Com'rs v.
State Capital Co., 16 Okla. 62*5, 86 Pac. 518;
Mahaffev v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 06 Pac.
342.
Texas. — Howth v. Greer, 40 Tex. Civ. App.
552, 90 S. W. 211.
United States.- — Moreland v. Marion Coun
ty, 17 Fed. Cas. Xo. 9,794, 1 X. Y. Wkly.
Dip. 326.
Mills Annot. St. Colo. I 1551, making it the
duty of the district attorney to appear for
any county in his district in any suit,
wherein such county is a party, pending in
the district court of any county in his dis
trict was not repealed by section 813, author
izing the board of county commissioners to
employ an attorney, and there is' no statute
which takes from the office of district at
torney any of the duties belonging to it un
der section 1551, or which vests the same in
the office of county attorney, or authorizes
the board of county commissioners to do so.
MdMullin e. Montrose Countv, 29 Colo. 478,
68 Pac. 779.
Magistrate's court.— The prosecuting attor
ney's duty extends to prosecutions or exami
nations before magistrates. State r. Jack
son, 68 Ind. 58; State p. Morrison. 64 Ind.
141 ; State v. Brown, 106 La. 437, 31 So. 50.
The district attorney may appear for the
state in a criminal prosecution on the part
of the state before the committing magis
trate. State v. Bezou, 48 La. Ann. 1309, 20
So. 892. Contra, Smith v. Portage County, 9
Ohio 25, the statute naming the courts in
which he must appear, not including magis
trates' courts.
On appeal by citizen from finding of county
board. — On an appeal by a citizen, under
Iowa Code, § 2450, to a district court from
a finding by a board of supervisors that a
statement of consent to the sale of intoxi
cating liquors in the county is sufficient, it
is proper for the county attorney to appear
against the statement in the district court,
and said section requires him to so appear.
Green v. Smith, 111 Iowa 183, 82 X. W. 448.
Mandamus to compel judge to allow county
attorney to take charge of prosecution in
city court see Jackson v. Swayne, 92 Tex.
242, 47 S. W. 711 [reversing (Civ. App.
1&98) 45 S. W. 619].
Proceeding to set aside forfeiture of recog
nizance. — The prosecuting attorney is the
proper person to represent the state in a
proceeding to set aside the forfeiture of a re
cognizance for the appearance of a defendant
to answer to an indictment, and upon his
appearance to the motion the court has juris
diction of the state. State v. Shide'er, 51
Ind. 64.
In England.— There has been such an officer
in England for centuries, his principal duty
being the prosecution of crimes and misde
meanors. Rex v. Philips, 3 Burr. 1564, 4
Burr. 2089. He is the only legal representa
tive of the crown in the courts, and he must
be before the court in every suit in which
the rights of the crown are concerned. Atty.-
Gen. v. Galway Corp., 1 Molloy 95; Iloven-
den v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 617. He is the
officer of the crown, and in that sense only
the officer of the public. Atty.-Gen. v.
Brown, 1 Swanst. 265, 36 Eng. Reprint 3S4,
1 Wils. Ch. 323, 37 Eng. Reprint 13S. During
a vacancy in the office his duties and au
thority ([evolved upon the solicitor-general.
Rex r*
.
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2554, 2570. In
all suits at the instance of the crown, the
attorney -general of a province has a right to
represent the crown, if the right claimed is
a right in behalf of the province. Atty.-Gen.
v. Esquimau, etc., R. Co., 7 Brit. Col". 221;
Monk v. Ouimet, 19 L. C. Jur. 71 [reforming
judgment in 17 L. C. Jur. 57]. A clerk of
the crown, whether a queen's counsel or not,
may conduct a case on behalf of the crown,
although he may not practice for individuals.
Reg. r. Leboeuf, 9 L. C. Jur. 197, 15 L. C.
Rep. 291.
23. In re Ison. 6 Oreg. 465; Terrell v.
Greene, 8S Tex. 539, 31 S. W. 631; Howth v.
Greer, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 552, 90 S. W. 211.
24. Sheridan Countv v. Hanna, 9 Wvo. 368,
63 Pac. 1054.
25. If he prosecute in the name of the state
or county a suit in which cither is really
interested as a defendant he violates .his
duty. Whiteside Countv v. Burchell, 31 111.
68;"Coulson v. Territory, 8 Okla. 113, 5G Pac.
956 : Spokane County v. Bracht, 23 Wash.
102, 62 Pac. 446. He cannot enforce laws for
his own benefit. Although bound to sue for a
penalty given by statute to the person suing
therefor he cannot retain it for himself. Peo
ple v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 12 111. App. 263.
If he renders professional assistance to a de
fendant in a criminal trial, he violates his
duty. In re Voss, 11 X. D. 540, 90 X. W. 15.
And he is not excused from enforcing the
laws because of local sentiment or prejudice.
In re Vcss, su\ira.
26. An action for damages for the illegal
sale of liquor to plaintiff's husband is not a
suit "based upon the same facts as an in
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cannot be restricted by statute.27 If fixed by statute, they may be increased or
diminished at the pleasure of the legislature.28 But in the absence of a statute,
neither the court nor the county board has any power to curtail the exercise of his
lawful authority or control him therein.29 One who fails to bring a suit which he
is required by law to bring may be compelled by mandamus.30 The prosecuting
attorney is bound to follow the business of the state or county into whatever courts
in his district it is authorized by law to be tried,31 including courts created sub
sequent to his appointment or election;32 but as a rule he is under no duty to
perform services in a federal court or in a court outside of the state.33 If the admin
istrative body of a county has by law the direction and control of litigation except
in certain cases, the district attorney cannot institute any other proceeding on
behalf of the county without authority from such bod}-.34 But his duty to insti
tute proceedings on behalf of the state is not dependent upon authority from any
public officer required to report violations of law and direct prosecutions in certain
cases.35 It is the duty of the outgoing attorney to turn over to his successor the
dictment " against the defendant for the il
legal sale of liquors not including the sale to
plaintiff's husband. Bellison p. Apland, 115
Iowa 599, 89 N. VV. 22.
27. Harris County r. Stewart, 91 Tex. 133,
41 S. W. 650; State v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307;
Howth v. Greer, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 552, 90
.S. W. 211. And see Thompson p. Carr, 13-
Bush (Ky.) 215. Under Tex. Const, art. 5,
§ 21, prescribing that county attorneys" shall represent the State in all cases in the
District and inferior courts in their respec
tive counties," except where the county is in
a district having a district attorney, any act
of the legislature attempting to deprive a
county attorney of his right to appear and
represent the state in any criminal case
charging violation of a state law, or making
the county attorney merely the associate or
assistant of a city attorney, and depriving
him of unrestricted control in such cases,
would be void. Tpton v. San Angelo, 42 Tex.
Civ. App. 7ff. 94 S. \V. 430.
28. State v. Morrison. 04 Ind. 141.
29. Clark p. Lyon County. 37 Iowa 469;
Logan Countv r. State Capital Co., 10 Okla.
625, 86 Pac. 518; Mahaffey r. Territory, 11
Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342.
Mandamus will lie to compel a judge to
permit the district attorney to appear for the
state or county in a case in which he has the
right to appear. Ex p. Lusk, 82 Ala. 519, 2
So. 140; Ex ;>. Wiley. 54 Ala. 220: Ex p.
Diggs, 52 Ala. 381 ; People v. Hallett. 1 Colo.
352: State r. Brown, 106 La. 437. 31 So. 50
(mandamus to compel justice of the peace) ;
Terrell P. Greene. 88 Tex. 539, 31 S. W. 631.
30. Berhil p. Fisk. 24 La. Ann. 149; State
r. Lynch. 23 La. Ann. 780; Hayes r. Thomp
son. 21 La. Ann. 055.
31. Blalock v. Pillsburv. 76 Ga. 493; Com.
p. Hippie. 09 Pa. St. 9.
'
But the court, not
the attorney, shall determine what courts
have jurisdiction thereof. Com. r. Hippie,
supra.
32. Moore p. State. 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 510.
Removal of case to federal court.— It is
the duty of the state's attorney to continue
the prosecution of cases against federal
officers begun in the state court and removed
to a federal court within the district. Dela
ware v. Emerson, 8 Fed. 411.
33. Nichols v. Shawnee County, 76 Kan.
266, 91 Pac. 79; Leavenworth
"
County P.
Brewer, 9 Kan. 307 ; Slavton v. Rogers," 107
S. W. 696, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 897. Ky. St. ( 1903)
S§ 120, 127, requiring each county attorney to
attend all county and fiscal courts in his
county, etc.. and providing that he shall con
duct actions before " any of the courts of
this commonwealth " in which the county is
interested, etc., do not require a county at
torney to perform services in a federal court
or in a court outside of the commonwealth ;
the words " courts of this commonwealth "
meaning only courts organized under the con
stitution and laws of the commonwealth.
Slavton r. Rogers', supra.
34. California. — Contra Costa Countv r.
Soto, 138 Cal. 57, 70 Pac. 1019; Ventura
County p. Clay, 119 Cal. 213, 51 Pac. 189.
Illinois.— Kankakee p. Kankakee, etc., R.
Co., 115 111. 88, 3 X. E. 741 : Frve p. Cilhoun
County, 14 111. 132.
Kansas.— Kerbv r. d .v County, 71 Kan.
683. 81 Pac. 503.'
Texas. — Looscan r. Harris Countv. 58
Tex. 511.
United States. — Hughes Countv r. Ward,
81 Fed. 314.
Presumption.— In the absence of an affirma
tive showing to the contrary, the court will
presume that suits on behalf of the county
were properly authorized. Jerauld County r.
Williams, 7 'S
.
D. 196, 63 X. W. 905.
Ratification. — The county has power to
ratify the action of the attorney in bringing
suit without authority. Hughes County r.
Ward, 81 Fed. 314.
Appeals.— If he may prosecute " when so
directed by the county or fiscal court," he
may, upon direction of the county court, prose
cute an appeal from an order of the fiscal
court, although the latter direct him to dis
miss the appeal. Bovd Countv p. Arthur, 118
Ky. fl32, 82 S. W. 613, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 906;
Jefferson County r. Waters, ill Ky. 280, 63
S. W. 613. 23 Kv. L. Rep. 66".
35. Hartley r. State, 53 Xebr. 310, 73
X. W. 744. But where the railroad commis
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management and control of all unfinished litigation.3" He has no authority to
represent the state after the expiration of his term.37
b. Contracts and Expenses. As a general rule, in the absence of a statute, a
district or prosecuting attorney cannot bind the county by a contract or for
expenses without authority from the county board ; 38 but it has been held that
where he is required by law or by the order of the county board to institute actions
for the benefit of the county, he may bind it to pajr the reasonable and necessaiy
expenses incident thereto.30
B. Conduct of Criminal Proceedings. At common law the prosecuting
attorney has absolute control of criminal prosecutions.40 He is vested with the
responsibility of determining whether or not a criminal accusation should be
pressed to trial.41 He may, in the absence of a statute, proceed without a prose
cutor.43 A criminal prosecution is the suit of the state; the prosecutor has no
right of control.43 The duty to conduct such prosecutions embraces whatever is
sion was charged witli enforcing certain
laws, it was held that the district attorney
could not bring suit for violation thereof
without authority from the commission.
Moore v. Bell, 05 Tex. 151, 66 S. W. 45.
36. Cole i?. McKune, 19 Cal. 422.
37. State v. Schloss, 92 Ind. 293; State 17.
Duff, 83 Wis. 291, 53 X. \V. 446. It has been
held, however, that it i* not error to permit
a former district attorney, who conducted the
first or later trials of a case during his term,
to appear in a new trial had after the ex
piration of his term, where his successor
makes no objection. Wiggins v. Com., 53 S.
W. 649, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 939.
38. Jones 17.Sunflower County, 84 Miss. 98,
36 So. 188, holding that he could not make
the county liable by contracting with a sur
geon to make an analysis of the stomach of
one thought to have been poisoned. See also
Independent Pub. Co. v. Lewis, etc.. County,
30 Mont. 83, 75 Pac. 860. A county is not
hound to pay for legal services rendered at
the instance of the county attorney, without
the previous authorization or subsequent offi
cial ratification of the countv board. Card
r. Dawes County, 71 Xebr. 78, 99 X. W. 662.
Under the New York county law (Laws
(1892), p. 1792, c. 686), § 230, subd. 2, pro
viding that all expenses necessarily incurred
by the district attorney in criminal actions
shall be a county charge, and subd. 9, pro
viding that the moneys necessarily expended
by any county office in executing the duties
of his office, where no specific compensation is
provided by law, shall be a county charge, it
was held that a district attorney, anticipat
ing that in a murder trial the defense of
suicide induced by insanity would be made,
had authority, in good faith, to engage the
services of eight experts of high standing, at
fifty dollars' and expenses each per day while
attending court and making experiments, and
to bind the countv by such contract. People
v. Cayuga County, 22 Misc. 616. 50 N. Y.
Suppl". 16. See" also People 0. Cortland
County, 15 X. Y. Suppl. 748. It has also
been held that, although a district attorney
may engage, when necessary, at the county's
expense, an expert witness in a criminal case,
under this statute he can Wnd the county to
pay only what is' just and reasonabk there
for. People v. Jefferson County, 35 X. Y.
App. Div. 239, 54 X. Y. Suppl. 782. Said sub
division 2 does not authorize a district at
torney to offer a reward to be paid by the
county for evidence by which to secure the
conviction of an offense not yet committed,
the same not being an expense necessarily in
curred in a criminal action. McXeil r. Suf
folk County, 114 X. Y. App. Div. 701, 100
X. Y. Suppl. 239. Xor does said subdivision
9 authorize him to offer a reward to be paid
by the county for evidence by which to stcure
the conviction for an offense not yet com
mitted. McXeil 17. Suffolk County, supra.
39. Christncr r. Hayes Countyj 79 Xebr.
1.57. 112 X. W. 347.
40. State v. Lauder, 13 X. D. 136, 90 X. W.
5G4. . , . • , .
TJ. S. Kev. St. (1878) § 363 [U. S. Comp.
St. <1901) p. 208], conferring upon the at-
torney-genernl of the United States power to
superintend any criminal prosecution insti
tuted by the district attorney, does not au
thorize him to make general regulations for
the control of criminal prosecutions. It con
fers power merely to give particular direc
tion in particular cases. Fish v. V. S., 36
Fed. 677.
In Nova Scotia delegation by the attorney-
general, under statutory authority, of power
to prefer an indictment, must be special and
relate to a particular ease. Reg. r. Town-
send, 28 Xova Scotia 468.
41. State v. Lauder, 13 X. D. 136, 90 X. W.
504; Rex V. Philips, 3 Burr. 1564, 4 Burr.
2080.
42. U. S. (7. Mundell, 27 Fed. Cas. Xo.
15,834, 1 Hughes 415, 6 Call (Va.) 245.
Under a statute requiring a prosecutor ex
cept in eertain cases, an order of court direct
ing the attorney to prefer an indictment
ex officio need not show on its face that no
one would prosecute. State v. Kittrell, 7
Baxt. (Term.) 167; Bennett v. State, 8
Humphr. (Tenn.) 118. The power so con
ferred does not expire with the term, but
operates as a mandate of the court so long
as the thing commanded remains unaccom
plished. State v. Cross, 2 Humphr. (Tenn.)
301.
43. Chambers i\ State, 3 Humphr. (Tenn.)
237; Em p. Gillespie, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 325.
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properly necessary to bring a criminal to trial.41 It does not include the power of
dispensing with criminal prosecution.45 In the absence of statute, the prosecuting
attorney generally has power to stay proceedings or enter a nolle prosequi without
the consent of the court.4' But he has no control over the final judgment of the
court.47 The attorney-general of the state usually has the right to represent the
state in the supreme court; but the duty of appealing lies with the district attorney.48
The latter may also sue out writs of error or certiorari to bring an indictment
into the supreme court.4" But as soon as a case reaches the supreme court, the
district attorney has no further control.50 The duty of prosecuting does not end
44. People v. Columbia Countv, 134 N. Y. 1,
31 X. E. 322 [affirming 50 Iluii 17, 8 X. Y.
Suppl. 752 (reversing 2 X. Y. Suppl. 351)].
Inspection of papers. — For that purpose the
district attorney is entitled to an inspection
of all papers and documents under the con
trol of the court, including a magistrate's
papers. People v. Olmstead, 25 Misc. (N. Y.)
346, 55 X. Y. Suppl. 472, Holding, in the ab
sence of statutory limitation, that the district
attorney is entitled to an inspection and
examination of all papers and documents
under the control of a city magistrate or
clerk of his court, and that on an applica
tion by him for a writ of mandamus com
pelling a magistrate to permit him to ex
amine such papers, the claim that, as a ju
dicial officer, the latter had the right to take
time for the consideration and determination
of the demand for such examination, is no
defense.
Agreement upon special judge. — A district
attorney has power in a criminal case to
agree on behalf of the state with defendant
upon a special judge, when the district judge
is disqualified to try the case, under a stat
ute allowing the parties to agree upon a
special judge under such circumstances.
Davis v. State, 44 Tex. 523 [overruling
Murray V. State, 34 Tex. 331] ; Early v. State,
9 Tex.'App. 476.
Authority to subpoena witnesses to testify
to violations of law includes power to ad
minister the oath, on examination concern
ing suspected violations. Bailey v. State, 40
Tex. Cr. 150, 49 S. W. 102, 41 "Tex. Cr. 157,
53 S. W. 117.
The practice of acting as inquisitor and ex
torting admissions or confessions from per
sons accused of crime is improper. State v.
Hagan, 164 Mo. 054, 65 S. W. 249.
Questioning defendant's witnesses.— But
there is no impropriety merely in asking de
fendant's witnesses what they know of the
case. Ross v. State, 8 Wvo. 351, 57 Pac.
924.
An expenditure of public money to a county
detective in purchasing liquors at various sa
loons, for the purpose of procuring evidence
of violations of law, is not against public
policy. People V. Orout, 38 Misc. (N. Y.)
181, 77 X. Y. Suppl. 321. But such expense
was not authorized by the common law, and
the prosecuting attorney had no power to
bind the county by a contract to pay there
for. Gibbonev' f . Camden County, 122 Fed.
46. 58 C. C. A. 228.
45. Thus, where a statute renders an offense
punishable by imprisonment or fine, or both,
the district attorney cannot waive imprison
ment and sue in debt for the fine. TJ. S. r.
Morin, 26 Fed. Cas. Xo. 15,810, 4 Biss. 93.
Xor can he delay investigation or prosecution
of violations of law because the city in which
such offenses occurred is about to institute
proceedings for their punishment. State r.
Trinkle, 70 Kan. 396, 78 Pac. 854. And he
has no authority to determine whether war
rants issued to a marshal shall be executed
or not. U. S. r. Scroggins, 27 Fed. Cas.
Xo. 16.244, 3 Woods 529. A prosecuting
attorney has no right, at his own discretion,
to stop criminal proceedings instituted before
a justice of the peace, or to direct the sheriff
not to execute a valid warrant of arrest in
his hands for execution. Beecher v. Anderson,
45 Mich. 543. 8 X. W. 539.
Stipulation as to forfeiture of recognizance.
— If he is not in a position either to go to
trial or to demand a forfeiture of the
recognizance, he may agree, in consideration
of consent to the forfeiture, to set it aside
upon the appearance of defendant at the next
term of the court. State r. Trinkle. 70
Kan. 396, 78 Pac. 854; State v. Foster, 32
Kan. 14, 3 Pac. 534.
46. See Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 374.
47. He has no authority to compromise a
judgment (Whittington v. Ross, 8 111. App.
234; Routt r. Feemster, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.)
131); or to allow an indulgence of time
within which to make payment of a fine
or other money judgment (Routt r. Feemster,
supra; Bennett r. State, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.)
472) ; nor to remit any portion of a sentence
(State p. Brewer, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 45-).
But power to collect fines implies the power
to receive the money, and to give a receipt
therefor which will discharge the defendant.
People r. Christerson, 59 111. 157.
48. State v. Grimmell, 116 Iowa 596, 88
N. W. 342: State r. Fleming. 13 Iowa 443.
And see Independent Pub. Co. v. Lewis, etc.,
County, 30 Mont. 83. 75 Pac. 860.
49. State l\ Xew Jersey Jockev Club, 52
K. J. L. 493, 19 Atl. 976; "State r. Zabriskie.
43 N. J. L. 369 [ reversed on other grounds
in 43 X. J. L. 640, 39 Am. Rep. 610] : Com.
r. Capp. 48 Pa. St. 58.
50. State r. Fleming, 13 Iowa 443; Inde
pendent Pub. Co. r. Lewis, etc.. County. 30
Mont. 83, 75 Pac. 860.
If he be required to appear in the supreme
court, he is there subject to the direction of
the attorney-general. People v. Bussev, 80
Mich. 501, 45 X. W. 594.
In Georgia, however, where writs of error
lie direct to the supreme court from city
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PROSECUTING AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS [32 Cyc] 715
with judgment. The district attorney must cause to be issued all process necessary
to carry into execution the judgment of the court."
C. Prosecution and Defense of Civil Actions and Proceedings. The
duty of representing the state in the courts, although purely statutory, usually lies
with the district or prosecuting attorney in all cases, unless expressly imposed upon
another officer. No special enabling statute is necessary where his authority is
conferred in general terms, requiring him to prosecute and defend on behalf of the
state and county all actions, motions, etc., civil and criminal, before the courts in
his district or any judge thereof.32 Unless otherwise provided by law, all suits
courts, the solicitor of which is required by
statute to represent the state in all criminal
cases prosecuted therein, it is held that it
is the duty of such solicitor to represent the
state in the supreme court in criminal cases
brought there from the citv court. Fam-
brough v. State, 113 Ga. 034, 39 8. E. 324;
Cooper r. State, 103 Ga. 405, 30 R. E. 240.
It is the duty of the solicitor-general of the
Atlanta circuit to represent the state in the
supreme court in a case pending there on a
writ of error from the supreme court of
Fulton county, in which error is assigned
upon the refusal of the judge of the superior
court to sanction a petition for a certiorari,
to be directed to the criminal court of At
lanta. Williams c. State, 121 Ga. 195, 48
S. E. 938.
51. Washington County Levy Ct. v. Ring
gold, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8.305, 2 Cranch C. C.
659 [affirmed in 5 Pet. 451, 8 L. ed. 188].
52. State v. Smith, 13 La. Ann. 424; Mat
ter of Arnett, 49 Hun (N. Y.) 599, 2 X. Y.
Suppl. 428. See also People v. Brady, 90
Mich. 450, 51 N. W. 537; Logan Comity T.
State Capital Co., 16 Okla. 625, 86 Pac.*518.
Federal courts. — This duty extends to suit
brought in a federal court against his county.
Graham I'. Parham, 32 Ark. 676.
He generally has authority, and it is his
duty, to institute proceedings: To restrain
public nuisances. Tottenham Urban Dist.
Council v. Wiliamson. [1896] 2 Q. P. 353,
60 J. P. 225, 65 L. J. Q. B. 591, 75 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 238, 44 Wkly. Rep. 076; Attv.-
Gen. v. Wimbledon House* Estate Co., [1904]
2 Ch. 34, 68 J. P. 341, 73 L. J. Ch. 593,
2 Loc. Gov. 826, 91 L. T. Rep. N. S. 103,
20 T. L. R. 489 : Attv.Gen. r:
'
Ashborne
Recreation Ground Co.. [1903] 1 Ch. 101,
67 J. P. 73, 72 L. J. Ch. 67. 87 L. T. Rep.
X. S. 561, 19 T. L. R. 39, 51 Wkly. Rep. 125;
Wallasey Local Bd. v. Gracey. 30 Ch. D. 593,
51 J. P. 740, 56 L. J. Ch. 739, 57 L. T. Rep.
X. S. 51, 35 Wkly. Rep. 694; Attv.-Con. v.
Shrewsbury Bridge Co., 21 Ch. I>. 752, 51
L. J. Ch. 746, 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 087,
30 Wkly. Rep. 916; Soltau v. De Held, 16
Jur. 320, 21 L. J. Ch. 153. 2 Sim. N. S. 133,
42 Eng. Ch. 133, 61 Eng. Reprint 291, unless
plaintiff has sustained special damages. He
may then file a bill without making the at
torney-general a party. To restrain erection
of a public building illegally authorized.
Homaday v. State, 62 Kan. 822, 62 Pac. 329 ;
State v. Marion County Com'rs. 21 Kan.
419. To recover penalties incurred for viola
tions of law. People v. Brady, 90 Mich.
459, 51 N. W. 537. Mandamus to enforce
performance of a public duty. State r.
Faulkner, 20 Kan. 541; Bobbett v. State,
10 Kan. 9. See Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 398
et seq. Quo warranto to try title to public
office. Bartlett v. State, 13 Kan. 99. See,
generally, Quo Warranto. To enjoin an un
authorized issue of bonds by city officials.
State ». Kansas City, 60 Kan. 518, 57 Pac.
118. To enjoin payment of a claim wrong
fully allowed bv the county. State v. Head-
lee,* 18 Wash. 220, 51 Pac. 369. And see
Tehama County p. Sisson, 152 Cal. 167, 92
Pac. 64, holding that under County (Govern
ment Act (St. (1897) p. 452, c. 277), 8 8,
requiring the district attorney to sue where
the board of supervisors shall without au
thority of law order any money paid, etc.,
the district attorney may, -without authority
from the board, sue to restrain the payment
of a warrant issued in violation of Const,
art. 11, 8 18, providing that no county shall
in any year incur an indebtedness in excess
of the revenues for the year. To prevent
public officers from misappropriating public
funds. Territory Bd. of Education c. Ter
ritory, 12 Okla. 286, 70 Pac. 792. To
prosecute foreclosure suits to which the state
is a party. State ». Fitzpatriok, 5 Ida. 499,
51 Pac. 112. To proceed against corporations
for penalties imposed for failure to comply
with state laws (Com. »>.Grand Cent. Bldg.,
etc., Assoc, 97 Ky. 325, 30 S. W. 626. 17
Kv. L. Rep. 215), or for breach of charter
(Atty.-Gen. r. Great Northern R. Co., 6 Jur.
N. S. 1006, 29 L. J. Ch. 794, 2 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 653, 8 Wkly. Rep. 556). To compel
tlie performance of a public trust imposed
upon a corporation. Evan v. Avon, 29 Beav.
144, « Jur. N. S; 1361, 30 L. J. Ch. 165,
3 L. T. Rep; N. S. 347. 9 Wkly. Rep. 84,
54 Eng. Reprint 581. To restrain, or after
ward to impeach, the alienation of corporate
property made pending the granting of a
charter. Attv.Gen. ('. Avon, 3 De G. J. & S.
637. 33 L. J.*Ch. 172. 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 187,
2 New Rep. 564, 11 Wklv. Rep. 1050, 68
Eng. Ch. 483. 46 Eng. Reprint 783.
The attorney-general alone has power to
inquire into excess of statutory powers by a
public corporation. Pudscy Coal Gas Co. v.
Bradford, L. R. 15 Eq. 1C7, 42 L. J. Ch. 293,
28 L. T: Rep. N. S. 11, 21 Wklv. Rep. 286;
Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., 3 De G. & J. 212,
5 Jur. N. S. 25. 28 L. J. Ch. 153. 7 Wkly.
Rep. 67, 60 Eng. Ch. 105, 44 Eng. Reprint
1250.
Appeals.— -As the county attorney may not
generally bring suit on behalf of the county
without authority from the proper officers
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on behalf of the state should be brought by the prosecuting attorney in the name
of the state.53 A relator is not necessary,54 unless required by statute.55 The
prosecuting attorney has entire dominion and control over every proceeding on
behalf of the state, whether it be prosecuted ex officio or at the instance of a rela
tor.50 He may, with the permission of the court, avail himself of the assistance of
(see supra, IV, A, 2), so lie may not take
an appeal on behalf of the county without
such authority (Montgomery County v. Tip
ton, 15 S. W. 240, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 847
[overruling Com. v. Kimberlin. 8 Bush (Kv.)
444). But under Ky. St. (1903) § 127, the
county attorney is required to prosecute ap
peals from orders of the fiscal court when
directed to do so by the county court. Jef
ferson County r. Young, 120 Kv. 450, 8G
S. W. 985, 27' Ky. L. Rep. 849 : Bovd County
V. Arthur, 118 Kv. 932, 82 S. W. 013, 26
Kv. L. Rep. 900.' Under Ky. St. (1903)
|| 120, 127, 129, 978, 4303, requiring the
county attorney to attend courts in his
county, conduct all cases touching the in
terests of the county, oppose the allowance of
all unjust claims, and authorizing appeals to
the circuit court from judgments of the fiscal
court in civil cases, and to the circuit court
from the decision of the county court in pro
ceedings for establishing highways, etc., the
county attorney may, without order from
the county or fiscal court, appeal from an
allowance of damages awarded to an owner
over whose land a proposed highway is to
run; section 127 not imposing any limita
tion on the authority of the county attorney.
Breckinridge County v. Rhodes, 105 S. W.
903, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 352. In Idaho, under
the act of Feb. 2, 1899 (Laws (1899), p. 25),
fixing the powers and duties of county at
torneys, and Rev. St. (1887) S 1759, subd.
13, giving county commissioners power to
direct prosecutions and defense of suits to
which the county is a party, the prosecuting
attorney must look after and defend all
litigation instituted against the county, and
has power to appeal from the district court
to the supreme court without an order of
the commissioners authorizing him to do so.
Twin Falls County v. Bassett, 14 Ida. 324,
93 Pac. 774.
Waiver of service of summons. — A county
attorney has authority to waive issuance
and service of summons in error in a case
against a county in which he has appeared
for it at the trial. Dakota Countv r. Bart-
lett, 07 Nebr. 62, 93 N. YY. 192.
Action to rescind contract.— The county at
torney, especially when authorized by the
fiscal court and counsel employed by author
ity of the court to assist him, had authority
to institute an action in the name of the
county to rescind a contract made by the
countv. Daviess County r. Daviess County
Gravel Road Co., 03 S. W. 752, 23 Kv. U
Rep. 711.
Qui tarn actions. — It is not the duty of the
attorney-general to prosecute qui tarn actions,
although the state is entitled to a part of
the proceeds. In re Atty.-Oen., Mart. & Y.
(Tenn.) 285.
Collection of taxes.— Under Ky. St. (1903)
§ 127, making it a county attorney's duty to
prosecute all cases in his county in which
the county is interested, and when so directed
by the fiscal court to institute actions before
any court in the commonwealth in which the
county is interested, it is his dutj- to conduct
a proceeding to ascertain the amount of
taxes due and unpaid preliminary to a suit
for their collection, when directed to do so
by the fiscal court. Terrell v. Trimble.
County, 108 S. W. S48, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 364.
Instructions to a district attorney of the
United States " to appear and defend the in
terests of the United States involved '" in
an action against federal officers does not
authorize the district attorney to make the
United States a party defendant and liable
to have judgment rendered against it. Stan
ley i\ Schwalby, 102 U. S. 255, 16 S. Ct.
754, 40 L. ed. 900.
District and county attorneys.— The gen
eral authority of the district attorney to
represent the state in all actions in the dis
trict court does not supersede the right of
the county attorney to maintain therein, on
behalf of the state, certain actions which he
is directed by special statute to prosecute.
San Antonio, etc., R. Co. r. State, 79 Tex.
204, 14 S. W. 1063.
53. In the absence of statutory authority,
a suit brought by the " prosecuting attorney
in 'behalf of the people of the state," should
be dismissed for want of proper parties.
Patterson r. Temple, 27 Ark. 202.
United States.— A bill purporting to be
brought by the United States on relation of
certnin persons, but not stating that it is
brought by the district attorney and not
signed by him, is bad on demurrer. U. S. r.
Doughty, 25 Fed. Cas. Xo. 14,986. 7 Blatchf.
424.
54. In re Bedford Charity, 2 Swanst. 470,
19 Kev. Rep. 107, 36 Eng. Reprint ©96.
55. Where the sole relator dies, application
for a new relator must be made by the at
torney-general (Atty.-Gen. v. Plumptree, 5
Madd. 452, 50' Eng. Reprint 968) ; but after
decree the application must be made by the
new relator, with the consent of the attor
ney-general (Attv.-Gen. v. Harvey, 3 Eq. Rep.
992, 1 Jur. N. S. 1062, 3 VVkly. Rep. 636).
The names of relators will not be struck
out, although defendants would not be preju
diced, unless it appears, either that justice
cannot be done without the alteration, or
that the suit can so be more conveniently
prosecuted. Attv.-Gen. r. Cooper, 1 Jur. 790.
3 Mvl. & C. 258, 14 Eng. Ch. 258, 40 Eng.
Reprint 923.
Where relators refuse to proceed, new re
lators will be substituted upon giving in
demnity for all costs. Attv.-Gen. r. Cashel
Corp., Sau. & Sc. 333.
56. Atty.-Gen. v. Haberdashers' Co., 15
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other counsel.57 He has the same power to bind the state by agreement to submit
a matter to arbitration as the attorney for a private litigant would have; 58 but he
has no right to accept a compromise judgment.5" Nor can he accept anything
but money in satisfaction of a money judgment in favor of the state. He has no
authority to purchase in the name of the state lands sold under an execution in
its favor.80 He represents the state and is presumed always to be in court.61 As
the statutes of limitations do not run against the state, delay or laches will not be
imputed to him.63 It is his duty to take an appeal in all cases where, according
to his judgment, the state has been injured by a decision.63 In some states it is
for the county board to determine whether suits shall be brought on behalf of the
county."*
D. Outside of County or District. A district or prosecuting attorney is
not required to go beyond the limits of his district to prosecute or defend litigation
for the state K or county.6" Upon a change of venue the duty to represent th*
state devolves upon the prosecuting attorney of the county to which the cause is
removed.67 He cannot, without express statutory authority, appear for the state
in the supreme court, upon the appeal of criminal cases.68 Nor is he required to
appear for the county in the supreme court unless the statute so directs.69
V. LIABILITIES.
A. Civil Liability. A prosecuting attorney, being a judicial officer of the
state, is not liable in damages for acts done in the course of his duty, although
wilful, malicious, or libelous.70 Neither he nor his sureties are liable for bis neglect
Beav. 397, 16 Jur. 717, 51 Eng. Reprint 591;
Ludlow v. Greenhouse, 1 Bligh N. S. 17, 4
Eng. Reprint 780; Atty.-Gen. v. Ironmongers
Co., Cr. & Ph. 208, 5 Jur. 356, 10 L. J. Ch.
201, 18 Eng. Ch. 208, 41 Eng. Reprint 469
[affirming 2 Beav. 313, 17 Eng. Ch. 313, 48
Eng. Reprint 1201].
However, the courts have the same author
ity over him as over other suitors, and he
will not be permitted to prosecute any case
merely vexatious, or without legal object.
Reg. v. Prosper, 11 Beav. 306, 13 Jur. 71, 18
L. J. Ch. 35, 50 Eng. Reprint 834.
The relator is not a party, has no control,
and cannot be heard in person. Atty.-Gen.
v. Galway, 1 Mollov 95; Atty.-Gen. v. Barker.
4 Myl. A C. 262, *18 Eng. Ch. 262, 41 Eng.
Reprint 103. His counsel cannot be heard
in any other capacity than as counsel for the
prosecuting attorney. Atty.-Gen. v. Ironmon
gers Co., Cr. A Ph. 208, 5 Jur. 356, 10 L. J.
Ch. 201, 18 Eng. Ch. 208, 41 Eng. Reprint
57. Com. v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 3 Cush.
(Mass.) 25. See Criminal Law, 12 Cvc.
530.
58. Judson v. U. S., 120 Fed. 637, 57
C C A 99
59. State v. Allen, 32 Tex. 273;' U. S. e.
Beebc, 180 U. S. 343, 21 S. Ct. 371, 45 L. ed.
563.
60. Littleton v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.)
669.
61. If he does not appear it must be con
sidered as a nil dicit ; the court will not order
him to appear. Barcley r. Russell, Dick. 729,
21 Eng. Reprint 454.
62. Atty.-Gen. v. Bradford Canal, L. R. 2
Eq. 71. 35 L. J. Ch. 619, 15 L. T. Rep. 9, 14
Wklv. Rep. 579.
But where he is merely acting for the in
terests of individuals, he will be barred by
the statute of limitations if they would be.
St. Mary Magdalen College v. Atty.-Gen., 6
H. L. Cas. 189, 3 Jur. N. S. 675, 26 L. J.
Ch. 620, 5 Wkly. Rep. 710, 10 Eng. Reprint
1267 [reversing 18 Beav. 223, 18 Jur. 363,
23 L. J. Ch. 844, 2 Wkly. Rep. 349, 52 Eng.
Reprint 88].
63. Fields v. State, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 168.
64. Kerby v. Clay County, 71 Kan. 683, 81
Pac. 503, holding that the board of county
commissioners, being given the management
and control of the business and the financial
affairs of the county, has the right to de
termine whether actions shall be brought
in its name to recover moneys allowed and
paid out of the county treasury without au
thority; and the county attorney may not
institute and carry on such litigation without
the consent and concurrence of the board.
See supra, IV, A, 2.
65. Martin v. State, 39 Kan. 576, 18 Pac.
472.
66. Herrington c. Santa Clara County, 44
Cal. 496; Leavenworth County Com'rs v.
Brewer, 9 Kan. 30/; Thompson v. Carr, 13
Bush (Ky.) 215.
67. Bevington v. Woodbury County, 107
Iowa 424, 78 N. W. 222 ; State V. Whitworth,
26 Mont. 107, 66 Pac. 748; Gandy v. State,
27 Nebr. 707, 43 N. W. 747, 44 N. W. 108.
Compare People v. Neff, 121 N. Y. App. Div.
44, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 559 [affirmed in 191
N. Y. 286, 84 N. E. 63].
68. Km p. State, 115 Ala. 123, 22 So. 115.
69. Eagle River v. Oneida County, 86 Wis.
266. 56 N. W. 644.
70. Griffith r. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44
X. E. 1001; Farrar v. Steele, 31 La. Ann.
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to perform any duty not expressly enjoined upon him by statute." He is liable
for moneys actually received in his official capacity; n but the mere failure to
collect moneys which it was his duty to collect does not make him liable, if not
actually received,73 unless lost through his unwarrantable neglect.74 The sureties
on his official bond are not liable for moneys received by him, which it was not
his duty to collect.75 Nor is he responsible for the default or fraud of subordinate
officers.76
B. Criminal Responsibility.77 For official misconduct, as the taking of a
bribe, etc., a prosecuting attorney may be indicted and punished, either for the
common-law offense of malfeasance in office or under the statutes.78 The fact that
he is by law subject to impeachment for misdemeanors in office does not make
impeachment a condition precedent to an indictment for malfeasance in office and
punishment thereunder.79 Approval of a bail-bond for the purpose of enabling
a prisoner to escape arrest for another offense committed in another county is
misbehavior in office.80 If a county attorney be removed from office by a statutory
civil action on account of misconduct in office, he is not thereby relieved from
criminal prosecution.81
VI. DEPUTIES, ASSISTANTS, AND SUBSTITUTES.
A. Appointment 82— 1. In General. The legislature has control of the
office of prosecuting attorney and power to provide for the appointment of attorneys
pro tempore to act during the absence, disqualification, or neglect or refusal to act,
of the state's attorney, and this notwithstanding the office is created, and the
method of election or appointment provided for, by the constitution; M and
640; Parker v. Huntington, 2 Gray (Mass.)
124.
71. State v. Egbert, 123 Ind. 448, 22 N. E.
256.
72. Gilbert v. Iaham, 16 Conn. 525.
Action by county for fines collected. — Un
der Ga. Pen. Code (1895), § 798 (7), provid
ing that solicitors-general shall at the fall
terra of each court yearly settle with the
county treasurer and pay over to him all
moneys due according to law, an action by
the county to recover fines collected was pre
maturely brought before the close of the fall
term of the court. Butts County v. Blood-
worth, 127 Ga. 141, 50 S. E. 106.
73. Fairlie v. Maxwell, 1 Wend (N. Y.)
17; Peoples. Van Wyck. 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 260.
74. U. S. v. Ingersoll, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15.440, Crabbe 135.
75. Wilson v. State, 67 Kan. 44, 72 Pac.
517.
76. U. S. v. Ingersoll, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15.440, Crabbe 135.
77. Suspension or removal and disbarment
see supra, II, E, 1.
Demand or receipt by United States district
attorney of other compensation than that
provided by law see supra, III, B. 5.
Punishment of assistant United States dis
trict attorney for contempt of state court.—
An assistant United States district attorney
appointed by a United States district judge,
as authorised by Act Cong. Mav 28. 1S96,
c. 252, § 8. 29'U. S. St. at L. '181 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 613], is an officer of the
court, and where one, in his official capacity
as such assistant district attorney, procures
the production of state court records before a
federal grand jury under an ordinary sub-
poena duves tecum, and thereafter holds pos
session of such records as such attorney, he
is not subject to punishment for contempt of
the state court for failure to return such
records on demand. In re Leaken, 137 Fed.
680.
78. Com. v. Rowe, 112 Ky. 482, 66 S. W.
29, 23 Ky. L. Bep. 1718.
79. Com. v. Eowe, 112 Ky. 482, 66 S. W.
29, 23 Ky. L. Bep. 1718 [citing Com. v.
Thomas, 9 Ky. L. Bep. 289].
80. State v. Wedge, 24 Minn. 150.
81. State v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 3 Pac.
534.
82. De facto assistant see supra, II, B, 3.
As officers of the court see supra, I.
83. Colorado.— Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo.
441, 36 Pac. 221.
Florida.— King v. State, 43 Fla. 211, 31
So. 254.
Kansas.— In re Gilson, 34 Kan. 641, 9 Pac.
763; State v. Nield, 4 Kan. App. 626, 45 Pac.
623.
Louisiana,— State v. Beid, 113 La. 890, 37
So. 866; State v. Boudreaux. 14 La. Ann. 88;
State v. Base, 12 La. Ann. 862.
Mississippi. — Keithler v. State, 10 Sm. &
M. 192.
Missouri. — State c, Moxlev, 102 Mo. 374,
11 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556.
Nebraska.— Spaulding v. State, 81 Nebr.
289, 85 N. W. 80. The fact that an attorney
appointed under Comp. St. (1895) c. 7, $ 21,
as a substitute for a county attorney in the
latter's absence or sickness, may prosecute
offenses by information does not render that
section obnoxious to Bill of Rights, $ 10. re
quiring the legislature to provide for holding
persons to answer for crimes on information
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notwithstanding the fundamental law also provides the method of filling vacan
cies.81 The appointment must be in the manner, if any, prescribed by law. If
it is required to be in writing, mere oral authority to act is not sufficient.86 A
special act providing for the appointment of a deputy solicitor for a certain court
supersedes the general law on the subject of appointment of solicitors pro tem.M
2. By the Court. Courts of general criminal jurisdiction have inherent power,
in the absence of statute, to appoint special attorneys for the state when the regular
officer is absent or disqualified, in order to prevent a failure of justice.87 And it is
the duty of the court to make such appointment whenever the state's attorney for
any cause fails to act.88 Such power is frequently conferred bj* express statutory
provision.89 If it be provided by law that the court may appoint a prosecuting
attorney pro tern, or assistant attorney under certain circumstances, it has no
power to do so except upon the contingencies specified,"0 especially if the power
of a public prosecutor. Korth v. State, 46
Xebr. 631, 65 N. W. 792.
Pennsylvania.— Com. v. McHale, 97 Fa. St.
397. 36 Am. Rep. 808.
Vermont.— In re Snell, 58 Vt. 207, 1 Atl.
566.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. " District and Prose
cuting Attorneys," § 10 ct scq.
Cal. County Government Act (1893) (St.
(1893) p. 359), § 25, subd. 36, declaring that
the county board of supervisors shall have
authority to authorize the district attorney
to appoint an assistant district attorney,
which office was thereby created, was not un
constitutional, since the assistant district at
torney was but a deputy, and by section 61
of the same act the district attorney could
appoint as many deputies' as he saw fit, and,
if not a deputy, the board had power to
authorize the district attorney to fill the
office when in their judgment the public in
terest required it. Freeman v. Barnuni, 131
Cal. 386, 63 Pac. 691.
84. State v. Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 1076, 6
So. 802.
85. Murray v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 219, 87
S. W. 349.
86. Douglass v. Prowell, 130 Ala. 580, 30
So. 498.
87. Alabama.-*- En p. Diggs, 50 Ala. 78.
Florida.— King v. State, 43 Fla. 211, 31
So. 254.
Georgia.— Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68
Am. Dec. 493.
Indiana.— Tull v. State, 99 Ind. 238.
Iov>a.— White r. Polk County, 17 Iowa 413.
Missouri. — State v. Duncan) 116 Mo. 288,
22 S. W. 699; Sta v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374,
14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556.
Tennessee. — Wilson v. State, 8 Yerg. 509;
Douglass r. State, 6 Yerg. 525; In re Gilles
pie, 3 Yerg. 325.
Texas. — Sta,te v. Gonzales, 26 Tex. 197;
State r. Johnson, 12 Tex. 231.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. " District and Prose
cuting Attorneys." § 11. And see Criminal
Law, 12 Cyc. 531.
Justices of the peace have no such power
in the absence of statute conferring it.
Davis i\ Linn County, 24 Iowa 508.
88. Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am.
Dec. 493. See Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 531.
89. Under statutes see Joyner v.' State, 78
Ala. 648 ; Ex p. Diggs, 50 Ala. 78 ; Adams v.
Com., Ill S. W. 348, 33 Kv. L. Rep. 779;
State v. Johnson, 41 La. Ann."l070, 6 So. 802;
State v. Boudreaux, 14 La. Ann. 88; State
v. Bass, 12 La. Ann. 862 ; Mathews v. Lincoln
County, 90 Minn. 348, 97 N. W. 101; People
l. Lytle, 7 N. Y. App. Div. 553, 40 N. Y. Suppl.
153; State v. Franklin County Com'rs, 20
Ohio St. 421 ; In re Prosecuting Atty., 2 Ohio
Dec. (Reprint) 602, 4 West. L. Month. 147;
Com. v. McHale, 97 Pa. St. 397, 39 Am. Rep.
808; Daniels v. State, (Tex Cr. App. 1903)
77 S. W. 215.
90. Toland v. Ventura County, 135 Cal.
412, 67 Pac. 498; Adams v. Com., Ill S. W.
348, 33 Kv. L. Rep. 779; Sayles v. Genesee
Cir. Judge", 82 Mich. 84, 46 N. W. 29 ; Kouns
v. Draper, 43 Mo. 225 ; Mahaffey v. Territory,
11 Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342.
Under Mills Annot. St. Colo. § 1556, author
izing the court to appoint a special attorney
if the district attorney is interested, or shall
have been employed as counsel in any case
which it shall be his duty to prosecute or de
fend, and section 1557, providing that, if th»
district attorney be sick or absent, the court
shall appoint some person to discharge the
duties of the office, where the court does not
find that the district attorney's motives in
dismissing prosecutions are corrupt, but finds
that they are not impure but that an inv
partial investigation cannot be had through
the district attorney's office because of the
partiality of the prosecutor, the appointment
of a special prosecutor is not authorized.
Gray v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 42 Colo.
298* 94 Pac. 287.
Under Ida. Sess. Laws (1897), p. 74, § a,
only on the happening of some one of the
reasons that disqualify "the county attorney
can the court appoint a suitable person to
perform the duties of such attorney for the
time being. State v. Barber, 13 Ida. 65, 88
Pac. 418.
Iowa Code, § 304, empowering the district
court to appoint an attorney to act as county
attorney in case of the disability of the county
attorney, authorizes the district court to ap
point an attorney to act for the county at
torney in a matter before the grand jury in
which he is personally interested, but does
not authorize the court to appoint an attorney
to have charge of another matter before that
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of appointing them in other contingencies be vested elsewhere.91 The court also
has inherent power, independent of statute, in its discretion to allow assistant
counsel to the prosecuting attorney,92 unless the power of appointing assistants
is vested in other hands.93 The number of assistants to be allowed is within the
discretion of the court." The statutes sometimes provide for appointment by the
court of a substitute state's attorney in civil cases.95 An illegal order of appoint
body. State v. Miller, 132 Iowa 587, 100
X. W. 10S7.
Under Ky. St. (1903) § 118, requiring com
monwealth's attorneys to attend the circuit
court and prosecute public offenses, and under
section 120, authorizing circuit judges to ap
point a suitable attorney to act in a common
wealth attorney's absence, it was held error
to refuse to permit one appointed and com
missioned as commonwealth attorney to con
duct a murder prosecution, or if the court
believed he had no right to act, to appoint a
commonwealth'&' attorney pro tempore. Kee-
ton v. Com., 108 S. W."315, 32 Ky. L. Rep.
1164. See also Adams r. Com., HIS. W. 348,
33 Ky. h. Rep. 779.
By recorder.— Tex. Code Cr. Proc. (1895)
art. 38, provides that when any district or
county attorney shall fail to attend any term
of the court the judge or justice may ap
point an attorney for the term, who shall be
allowed the compensation allowed to the dis
trict or county attorney. The recorder of
the city of Houston has no term of court. It
was held that when acting as a justice in
prosecutions for violations' of the penal code
the recorder could only appoint where the
district or county attorney failed to attend,
and, there being no term, the appointment
must be made in each case. Harris County v.
Stewart, 91 Tex. 133, 41 S. W. 650.
91. MahafTey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 66
Pac. 342. Under a statute authorizing the
court to appoint a substitute during the ab
sence or disqualification of the district attor
ney and his assistant, if he has one, it may
make such appointment in the absence of the
district attorney although his assistant be
present. People v. Lytle, 7 X. Y. App. Div.
553, 40 X. Y. Suppl. 153. Under a statute
authorizing the appointment of a substitute
for the county attorney when he is " unable
to attend to his duties," physical or mental
incapacity is meant, not mere lack of ex
perience, knowledge, or skill. Mnhaffov v.
Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342. Power
to appoint a substitute in cases in which the
district attorney has been involved may be
exercised without first taking steps for' the
removal of the latter. People i\ Second Ju
dicial Dist. Ct., 29 Colo. 5. 66 Pac. S96. A
special attorney may not be appointed for
the sole purpose of examining a bill of costs
(State r. Seibert. 130 Mo. 202. 32 S. W. 070),
nor to prosecute an appeal (State r. Mar
shall County, 14 S. D. 149, 84 X. W. 775).
92. Alabama.— Shelton v. State, 1 Stew.
& P. 208.
California. — People v. Blackwell, 27 Cal.
65.
Colorado.— Hinsdale County i\ Crump, IS
Colo. App. 59. 70 Pac. 159 ; Raymond v. Peo
ple, 2 Colo. App. 329. 30 Pac. 504.
Idaho.— State v. Crump, 5 Ida. 166, 47
Pac. 814, assistant employed by county com-
missioneiB.
Indiana .— Keves v. State, 122 Ind. 62}, 23
X. E. 1097; Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 289, 4
X. E. 870, 55 Am. Rep. 211; Tull v. State, 99
Ind. 238 ; Siebert v. State, 95 Ind. 471 : Wood
r. State, 92 Ind. 209; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind.
557, 71 Am. Dec. 370.
Kansas.— State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189,
•36 Am. Rep. 257.
Kentucky. — Tesh v. Com., 4 Dana 52i.
Maine.— State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200.
Massachusetts.— Com. v. Scott. 123 Mass.
222, 25 Am. Rep. 81 ; Com. v. King, 8 Gray
501 ; Com. v. Williams, 2 Cush. 582 ; Com. r.
Knapp, 10 Pick. 477, 20 Am. Dec. 534.
Michigan.— People v. O'Neill, 107 Mich.
550. 65 N. W. 540.
Mississippi. — Edwards r. State, 47 Miss.
581.
Montana.— State v. Whitworth, 26 Mont.
107, 66 Pac. 748.
Ohio.— Price v. State, 35 Ohio St. 601.
Tennessee. — Staggs v. State, 3 Humphr.
372 ; Jarnagin v. State, 10 Yerg. 529.
Virginia. — Hopper v. Com., <5Gratt. 6S4.
Wisconsin.—Richards v. State. 82 Wis. 172,
51 X. W. G52; Lawrence v. State, 50 Wis.
507, 7 N. W. 343.
United States. — U. S. v. Hanwav, 20 Fed.
Cas. Xo. 15,299, 2 Wall. Jr. 139.
See also Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 530 et
seq.
93. Seaton r. Polk County. 59 Iowa 626, 13
X. W. 725; MahafTey v. Territory, 11 Okla.
213, 66 Pac. 342.
In reading the indictment to the jury,
private counsel, appointed assistant, acts as
countv attorney. State I). Crafton, 89 Iowa
109. 56 X. W. 257.
94. Thalheim r. State, 38 Fla. 169, 20 So.
938; Keves v. State. 122 Ind. 527, 23 \. E.
1097; Tull v. State, 99 Ind. 238; State r.
Sweeney. 93 Mo. 38. 5 8. W. 614; State r.
Griffin,' 87 Mo. 608 ; Richards v. State, 82
Wis. .172. 51 X. W. 652. See also Com. r.
Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 406, 20 Am. Dec.
401 ; and Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 532.
95. Thus by statute in Illinois it is made
the duty of the state's attorney to prosecute
" ' all forfeited bonds and recognizances, and
all actions and proceedings for the recovery
of debts, revenues, moneys, fines, penalties and
forfeitures' accruing to the State, or his
county, or to any school or road district in his
county': and . . . it is made the duty of the
court, whenever he is absent or unable to at
tend, or is interested in any cause or proceed
ing, civil or criminal, to appoint som? com
petent attorney to prosecute or defend such
cause or proceeding." See Mix v. People, 116
111. 205. 4 X. E. 783.
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ment of a special prosecuting attorney at the instance of a complaining witness
may be vacated by mandamus.06
3. By Governor, Attorney-General, Prosecuting Attorney, or Assistant,
County Board, Etc. The statutes sometimes provide for the appointment of
deputies, substitutes, or assistants to district or prosecuting attorneys by others
than the courts, as by the governor,97 attorney-general,98 district or prosecuting
attorney,99 county board,1 police jury,2 etc. The prosecuting attorney has power
to employ an assistant, by virtue of his statutory authority to use all diligence to
indict and convict offenders,3 unless the duty of providing assistants be imposed
by law upon some other authority.1 He may also appoint a deputy in the prose
cution of civil cases.5 But a general delegation of his powers by a prosecuting
attorney is against public policy and illegal, and it can furnish no basis for a claim
by the person to whom the powers were delegated for personal compensation for
his services.6 An assistant has no power to employ an assistant.7 In some
states counsel to assist the prosecuting attorney in a particular prosecution may
properly be employed by the board of supervisors, with the sanction of the court
and approval of the prosecuting attorney,8 unless prevented by statute. If the
statute prescribes the circumstances under which the county board may employ
assistant counsel, it is controlling.9 The attorney-general of the United States is
required to appoint such assistants as he may think necessary to assist the district
attorneys in the discharge of their duties.10
96. Sayleg v. Genesee Cir. Judge, 82 Mich.
84, 46 X. W. 29.
97. James v. Helm, 111 S. W. 335, 33 Ky.
L. Rep. 871 (to assist county attorney in civil
cases, under St. (1003) § 118); State v.
Barrow^ 30 La. Ann. 657 ; State v. Garrett, 29
La. Ann. 837; In re Snell, 58 Vt. 207, 3 Atl.
566. The Wisconsin statute authorizing the
governor to employ attorneys in certain cases
was held not to be applicable to a proceeding
before the governor to remove an officer from
office, such a proceeding not being one in
which the rights, interest, or other property
of the state are liable to be injuriously af
fected, nor an action prosecuted or defended
on behalf of the state. Randall v. State, 16
Wis. 340.
98. State v. Xield, 4 Kan. App. 626, 45
Pac. 623; State r. Russell, 26 La. Ann. 63.
99. State t\ Harris, 12 Xev. 414; People v.
XefT, 191 X. Y. 286. 84 X. E. 63 [affirmiiiq
121 X. Y. App. Div. 44, 105 N. Y. Suppl.
559].
Humber of deputies or assistants.— Under
Mo. Rev. St. (1899) § 3286 (Acts (1893),
pp. 168, 169), providing that the prosecuting
attorney in a county having a population of
one hundred thousand and less than three
hundred thousand shall be entitled to such
a number of deputies and assistants to be ap
pointed by him as the county court sha'l deem
necessary, and Mich deputies and assistants
sball be divided into classes and paid as fol
lows: Class A, chipf deputy, one thousand
five hundred dollars per year; class B, assist
ants or deputies, one thousand two hundred
dollars per year; and section 3287 providing
that the appointment and number of deputies
and assistnnts of a prosecuting attorney, not
expressly fixed by this article, shall be sub
ject to the approval of the judges of the crim
inal court, only one chief deputy can be ,ap
pointed in a county of the class named, and
the criminal court has power only to deter-
mine the number to be appointed in class I!.
Elliott v. Jackson County, 194 Mo. 532, 92
S. W. 480.
1. See Storey v. Murphey, 9 X. D. 115,
81 X. W. 23.
2. A statute authorizing police juries to
appoint a district attorney pro tern, within
thirty days does not prohibit such appoint
ment thereafter, provided the power of the
judge to act in such case has not been exer
cised in the meantime. State v. Montgomery,
25 La. Ann. 138 ; State v. Lynch, 23 La. Ann.
786.
3. State v. Recorder, 48 La. Ann. 1369, 20
So. 892; State t>.Anderson, 29 La. Ann. 774;
Engle v. Chipman, 51 Mich. 524, 16 X. W.
886; State !'. Harris, 12 Xev. 414; State v.
Ocean County, 47 X. J. L. 417, 1 Atl. 701.
And see State v. Mack, 45 La. Ann. 1155. 14
So. 141; State v. Mangrum, 35 La. Ann. 619.
See Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 530.
Preliminary examinations.— In Louisiana
the district attorney, if he is employed in the
discharge of other duties, may secure counsel
to appear in his stead before the committing
court in which a preliminary examination is
held. State v. Bezou, 48 La. Ann. 1369, 20
So. 892.
4. Seaton v. Polk County, 59 Iowa 626, 13
X. W. 725 ; Foster v. Clinton County, 51
Iowa 541, 2 X. W. 207; Tatlock r. Louisa
County, 46 Iowa 138.
5. Parker v. May, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 336.
6. Engle v. Chipman, 51 Mich. 524, 16
X. W. 886.
7. People v. Hurst, 41 Mich. 328, 1 X. W.
1027.
8. People v. Bemis, 51 Mich. 422. 16 X. W.
794. See Counties, 11 Cyc. 473; Criminal
Law, 12 Cvc. 530.
9. See Storey v. Murphy, 9 X. D. 115, 81
X. W. 23.
10. TJ. S. Rev. St. (1878) & 363 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 208].
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4. Upon Change of Venue. Since the proper officer to continue tne prosecution
on a change of venue is the district or prosecuting attorney of the county to which
the removal has been made," if he is absent or disqualified, or unable to prosecute
alone, the duty of appointing a deputy or assistant lies with the court or other
appointing power of that county, not the court of original venue.12
5. Presumption and Record. The law presumes that the appointment of a
prosecuting attorney -pro tern., appearing of record, was legally and properly made, •
although the record fails to state facts authorizing it. One who has acted as a
public officer is presumed to have been duly appointed until the contrary appears.1'
And unless required by statute, it is not necessary that the appointment itself be
shown by the record. The fact that another is permitted by the court to take the
place of the prosecuting attorney raises a presumption of, and is generally tanta
mount to, an appointment." However, this presumption may be overcome by
other facts upon the face of the record.16
B. Eligibility. 18 The qualifications prescribed by law for prosecuting attorneys
are not all required of assistants,17 since the latter are not state officers,18 unless
the office of assistant is expressly provided for by law.19 Attorneys at law, being
officers of the court, are presumed to be qualified to conduct criminal prosecutions,
and when employed to assist the state's attorney need not be sworn as to their
11. See supra, IV, D.
12. State v. Whitworth, 26 Mont. 107, 66
Pac. 748; Sands v. Frontier County, 42 Nebr.
837, 60 N. W. 1017; Fuller r. Madison
County, 33 Nebr. 422, 50 N. W. 255; Gandv
v. State, 27 Nebr. 707, 43 N. W. 747, 44
N. W. 108. Contra, Bevington v. Woodbury
County, 107 Iowa 424, 78 N. W. 222, hold
ing that the county of original venue, being
liable for the entire costs of the prosecution,
has power to appoint an assistant to aid in
the prosecution in the county to which it is
removed.
Since N. Y. County Law (Laws (189a),
p. 1786, c. 686, § 304), providing that the
district attorney of any county in which an
important criminal action is to be tried may
employ assistant counsel with the written
approval of the county judge of the county
filed in the county clerk's office, and that the
costs and expenses thereof, to be certified
by the presiding judge, shall be charged on
the county in which the indictment is found,
is the only source of authority for employ
ment of assistant counsel, the presiding jus
tice at the trial of a prosecution changed
from another county has no authority to fix
the compensation of an assistant employed by
the district attorney of the county where the
indictment was found, with the approval of
the county judge of that county, as the stat
ute clearly grants such authority only to the
district attorney of the county in which the
case is to be tried. People v. Neff, 191 N. Y.
286, 84 N. E. 63 [affirming 121 N. Y. App.
Div. 44, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 595].
13. Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 36 Pac.
221 ; State v. Nield, 4 Kan. App. 626, 45
Pac. 623; Price r. State, 35 Ohio St. 601;
Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S. W. 838
[overruling Pippin C. State, 2 Sneed (Tenn.)
43, and Staggs p. State, 3 Humphr. (Tenn.)
372, so far as these hold that the facts au
thorizing the appointment must appear upon
the record]. See also Isham v. State, 1
Sneed (Tenn.) Ill; Hite v. State, 9 Yerg.
(Tenn.) 198; Wilson v. State, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.)
509; Douglass v. State, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 525;
Kelly V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 480, 38 S. W. 39;
U. S. r. Twining. 132 Fed. 129.
14. California. — People v. Walters, 98 Cal.
138, 32 Pac. 864.
Colorado.— Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441,
36 Pac. 221.
Missouri.— State v. Duncan, 116 Mo. 288,
22 S. W. 699.
Ohio.— State v. Moore. 1 Ohio Dec. (Re
print) 506, 10 West. L. J. 219.
Tennessee. — Isham r. State, 1 Sneed 111.
Contra.— Joyner v. State, 78 Ala. 448, hold
ing that the appointment must be entered
upon the record, and can be shown only by
the record.
Sufficiency of record. — Under Mo. Rev. St.
(1899) § 4955, providing for the appoint
ment of a special prosecuting attorney where
the regular prosecutor's interest in a case
is inconsistent with his official duties, the
recital of a record that the regular prosecut
ing attorney had been employed as counsel
by defendant, and that for that reason S
was appointed special prosecuting attorney
in the case, was sufficient to sustain the ap
pointment. State v. Wilson, 200 Mo. 23,
98 S. W. 68.
15. State v. Davidson, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.)
184.
16. See also Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 530.
17. State v. Phelps, 5 S. D. 480, 59 N. W.
471, holding that the provision of Const,
art. 5, § 24. requiring a state's attorney
to be of the age of twenty-five years or
more, does not extend to a deputy appointed
under Laws (1891). c. 108. § 1, authorizing
a state's attorney to appoint a deputy.
18. Roes v. State. 8 Wyo. 351, 57 Pac. 924.
19. Assistant district attorneys of the
United States hold office by virtue of statute.
They are officers of the United States within
their respective districts. In re Leaken, 137
Fed. 080; San Francisco r. U. S., 21 Fed.
Cas. No. 12,316, 4 Sawy. 553.
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qualifications.30 In most jurisdictions, but not in all, counsel employed by persons
interested in a prosecution may be appointed or permitted by the court to assist the
state's attorney, and such private employment does not disqualify them.21 They
are not disqualified, although employed to prosecute civil suits based on the same
transactions; 22 nor by reason of their own interest in the prosecution.23 One may
be permitted to assist the state's attorney, although a non-resident of the county,24
or of the state.25 No one may act as such assistant who has been previously engaged
by the defendant, if the latter has disclosed his case to him.26 But a conditional
employment by the accused " or appointment to act as his counsel,28 without any
confidential communication having passed between them, does not disqualify.
C. Qualification. Unless required by the statute, an attorney appointed to
assist the prosecuting attorney need not be sworn nor give bond.29 But if appointed
to fill a vacancy, he shall give bond and take the oath of the prosecuting attorney.30
Assistants to the district attorneys of the United States are required to take the
oath prescribed for the district attorneys.81
D. Tenure. The office of prosecuting attorney "pro tern, may be expressly
20. People r. Wright, 89 Mich. 70, 50 X. W.
792.
21. Florida.— King r. State, 43 FJa. 211,
31 So. 254; Thalhet'm r. State, 38 Fla. 109,
20 So. 938.
Indiana.— Keves V. State, 122 Ind. 527,
23 X. E. 1097.
loica.— State t\ Helm, 92 Iowa 540. 61
N. \V. 246: State P. Shreves, 81 Iowa 615,
47 X. W. 899 ; State r. Montgomery, 65 Iowa
483. 22 X. W. 639; State v. Fitzgerald, 49
Iowa 260, 31 Am. Rep. 148.
Kansas.— State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189, 36
Am. Rep. 257.
Kentucky.— Bennvfield v. Com., 17 S. W.
271, 13 Ky. L. Rep! 446.
Maine.— State r. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200.
Nebraska.— Gandv V. State, 27 Xebr. 707,
43 X. W. 747, 44 X. W. 108; Bradahaw p.
State. 17 Xebr. 147. 22 X. W. 361; Folin
v. State, 14 Xebr. 540, 16 X. W. 898.
Netc Jersey.— Gardner p. State, 55 X. J.
L. 17, 26 Atl. 30 [affirmed in 55 X. J. L.
652, .30 Atl. 429].
Xorth, Dakota.— State v. Kent. 4 X. D.
577, 62 X. W. 631, 27 L. R. A. 686.
Tennessee. — Ex p. Gillespie, 3 Yerg. 325.
Texas.— Burkhard v. State, 18 Tex. App.
599.
Via h.— People v, Tidwell, 4 Utah 506, 12
Pae. 61. .
Virginia. — Hopper v. Com., 6 Gratt.
684.
See Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 531.
Contra.— Com. p. Gibbs, *4 Gray (Mass.)
146; Com. t'. Williams, 2 Cusli. (Mass.) 582;
Com. r. Knapp, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 477, 20
Am. Dec. 534; People v. Cline, 44 Mich. 290,
6 X. W. 671 ; People r. Hurst, 41 Mich. 328,
1 X. W. 1027; Sneed v. People, 38 Mich. 248;
Meister r. People, 31 Mich. 99; Bird v.
State, 77 Wis. 270, 45 X. W. 1126; Biemel
r. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 X. W. 244.
22. Jackson p. State, 81 Wis. 127, 51 X. W.
89; V. S. v. Twining, 132 Fed. 129. Contra,
Com. »'. Gibbs, 4 Grav (Mass.) 146; People
r. Hillhouse, 80 Mich. 580 45 X. W. 484;
People i\ Hendrvx, 58 Mich. 319, 25 X. W.
299.
23: Dale v. State, 88 Ga. 552, 15 S. E. 287;
Lawrence P. State, 50 Wis. 507, 7 X. Y.
343.
Wot disqualified because, before employ
ment, he was consulted by citizens at whose
instance the case is to be prosecuted (State v.
Reid, 113 La. 890, 37 So. 866), or because
he was district judge at the time the crime
was committed, and as such refused bail to
the accused (Ross p. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57
Pac. 924):
Not ineligible to prosecute violations of the
liquor law, although he has a strong prej
udice against the liquor traffic (People V.
O'Xeill, 107 Mich. 556, 65 X. W. 540) ; nor
because, after being retained by the state, he
was employed by the prosecuting witness to
defend him in other proceedings (People v.
Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 X. W. 13).
Discretion of court.—The propriety of per
mitting one to assist in the prosecution who
has been employed . against defendant's
brother, but not against defendant, is within
the discretion of the court. People v. Mon
tague, 71 Mich. 447, 39 X. W. 585.
24. State v. Corcoran, 7 Ida. 220, 61 Pac.
1034 ; People v. Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 66
X. W, 502.
25. State v. Kent, 4 X. D. 577, 62 X. W.
631, 27 L. R. A. 686. Contra, State v. Rus
sell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 X. W. 441.
26. Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392.
Nor if he represented defendant on a pre
liminary examination, although defendant
was discharged, if the present indictment
is for the same offense. State p. Halstead,
73 Iowa 376, 35 X*. W. 457.
27. State v. Lewis, 96 Iowa 280, 65 X. W.
295.
28. State p. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 24 S. W.
41.
29. People v. Wright, 89 Mich. 70, 50 X. W.
792; State P. Taylor, 98 Mo. 240, 11 S. W.'
570: Bush v. State, 62 Xebr. 128, 86 X. W.
1062; Martin p. State, 16 Ohio 364; Matter
of Prosecuting AttV., 2 Ohio Dec. (Reprint)
602, 4 West. L. Month. 147.
30. Matter of Prosecuting Attv., 2 Ohio
Dec. (Reprint) 602. 4 West. L. Month. 147.
31. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 366 [U, S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 209].
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created by law, in which case the tenure may be coterminous with that of the office
of district attorney.32 But unless the law provides for a permanent incumbent,
the tenure of office of one appointed prosecuting attorney pro tern, cannot extend
beyond the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the regular incumbent," or
beyond the term of court at which he was appointed.31
E. Powers and Duties. Counsel employed to assist in prosecuting criminal
cases have no authority to appear without first obtaining permission or appoint
ment from the court.33 Assistants are appointed to aid the state's attorney in
the discharge of the duties of his office. They have no authority to direct him, nor,
as against him, to control proceedings.38 A prosecuting attorney may not delegate
all of his powers to a deputy. Such delegation of powers by a public officer is
contrary to public policy.37 However, if present himself, he may intrust to his
associate the exclusive conduct of the case.38 But an assistant duly appointed
or permitted to prosecute is clothed with all the powers and privileges of the prose
cuting attorney, and all acts done by him in that capacity must be regarded as
if done by the prosecuting attorney himself.39 The same is true of prosecuting
attorneys pro tern. They may do whatever the district attorney is authorized
to do.40
F. Compensation and Fees — i. In General. The deputy, like his princi
pal, at common law received nothing for his services.41 Salary or fees being now
generally provided, to be paid prosecuting attorneys, their assistants or deputies
appointed by authority of law are entitled to compensation, and the county is
liable therefor.42 But he cannot recover for services in cases which he is not
32. State v. Parlange, 26 La. Ann. 548;
State V. Montgomery, 25 La. Ann. 138.
A statute authorizing the appointment of
district attorneys pro tem applies only where
vacancies exist, but does not abolish the office
of district attorney pro tem. nor effect the
tenure of one already occupying that office.
State v. Parlange, 26 La. Ann. 548.
33. Ex p. Diggs, 50 Ala. 78 ; State v. Man-
love, 33 Tex. 798.
34. State v. Manlove, 33 Tex. 798.
Where the law provides for the appointment
of a substitute for any term at which the dis
trict attorney fails to attend, a city recorder
who has no term of court must make the
appointment for each case. Harris County
V. Stewart, 91 Tex. 133, 41 S. W. 650.
35. Ex p. Gillespie, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 325;
Biemel r. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N. W. 244.
The decision of the court, granting or
withholding such permission, is final. From
it there is no appeal.
' Ex p. Gillespie, 3
Yerg. (Tenn.) 325.
36. Com. v. Williams, 2 Cush. (Mass.)
582; San Francisco )>. IT. S., 21 Fed. Cas.
No. 12,316, 4 Sawy. 553. And see Criminal
Law, 12 Cyc. 532.
37. Engle v. Chipman, 51 Mich. 524, 16
N. W. 886.
38. State v. Anderson, 29 La. Ann. 774.
39. People v. Magallones, 15 Cal. 426; State
p. Crafton, 89 Iowa 109, 56 N. W. 257 ; State
v. Taylor, 98 Mo. 240, 11 S. W. 570; U. S.
v. Tw"ining, 132 Fed. 129.
40. Idaho.— State v. Corcoran, 7 Ida. 220,
61 Pac. 1034.
Indiana.— Choen i>. State, 85 Ind. 209.
Louisiana.— State v. Montgomery, 41 La.
Ann. 1087, 6 So. 803.
Missouri. — Browne's Appeal, 69 Mo. App.
159; State V. Hynes, 39 Mo. App. 569. Un
der the express provisions of Rev. St. (1899)
§§ 4955, 4957, providing for the appointment
of a special prosecuting attorney where the
regular prosecutor's interest in a case
is inconsistent with his official duties, the
special prosecutor has all the power for the
purposes of the case in which he is appointed
that the regular attorney would have had.
State v. Wilson, 200 Mo. 23, 98 S. W. 68.
Nebraska.— Korth v. State, 46 Nebr. 631,
65 N. W. 792.
Oklahoma.— Canada r. Territory, 12 Okla.
409, 72 Pac. 375.
South Dakota.— State v. Phelps, 5 S. D.
480, 59 N. W. 471.
Texas.— State r. Lackey, 35 Tex. 367.
See 17 Cent. Dig. tit. "District and Prose
cuting Attorneys, § 16.
41. See supra, III, A, 1.
42. Tull p. State, 99 Ind. 238; Work t>.
Wapello County, 73 Iowa 357, 35 N. W. 452;
White v. Polk County, 17 Iowa 413; Sneed
v. People, 38 Mich. *248. Contra, under a
statute where there was no existing appro
priation therefor. Turner v. Elkhard County,
158 Ind. 166, 63 N. E. 210.
Right to compensation implied.—Where, un
der Minn. Gen. St. (1894) § 813, a judge
of the district court, upon due hearing, de
termines that a county attorney is disquali
fied from taking part in the prosecution of a
person accused of crime, and directs another
attorney of the court to conduct the same
in place of the regular official, the substitute
is entitled to receive compensation for the
services lie performs, under the court's ap
pointment, from the county where the crime
is alleged to have been committed, although
the statute makes no express provision for
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authorized to prosecute;43 nor can he recover fees in cases which do not come
within the statute allowing . them." If appointed without authority of law he
is not entitled to anything, notwithstanding the services have been rendered and
accepted.4"' The mode of payment is usually prescribed by the statute." A con
tract by a prosecuting attorney to pay a deputy more compensation than that
provided by law is contrary to public policy and void.47
2. Division of Fees. If the same fee. is provided by law for conviction in either
the county or circuit court, or in both, the attorney pro tern, must share the fee with
the state's attorney in case of conviction obtained by one in the county court, and
affirmance on appeal to the circuit court by the other.48
compensation. Mathews r. Lincoln County,
90 Minn. 348, 97 N. W. 101.
Amount of salary.— The provision of the
California County Government Act of 1893
that the district attorney may appoint one
assistant at a salary of two thousand dollars,
and two deputies at a salary of one thousand
five hundred dollars per annum, does not
mean one thousand five hundred dollars for
the two deputies, but for each. Freman v.
Marshal. 137 Cal. 159, 69 Pac. 980.
In California, under Acts (1893), § 173,
and Acts (1897), §§ 59, 215, 233, the deputy
district attorneys of Tulare county who were
holding office at the time of the enactment
of the law of 1897 are entitled to the salary
provided by the law of 1893. McPhail v.
Jefferds, 130 Cal. 480, 02 Pac. 735.
Fixing of salary by county board. — Since
deputy county attorneys are included bv Act
March 19, 1895, in Mont. Pol. Code, 8*4596,
fixing the maximum salary of county officers,
the board of county commissioners have
power to fix the salaries of deputy county at
torneys under Sess. Laws (1893), p. 60,
establishing the number of deputy county
officers, and providing that their compensa
tion shall be determined by the board of
county commissioners, within the maximum
limits fixed by the act, although deputy county
attorneys are not provided for therein. Pen-
well v. Lewis, etc., County, 23 Mont. 351, 59
Pac. 167. Construing said section 4596,
which declares that the maximum compensa
tion of any deputy is as follows, setting out
various officers whose salaries are declared
" not to exceed " the sum fixed, but in which,
in providing for the salary of chief deputy
county attorney, the words "not to exceed"
are omitted, it was held that, since the act
Srovides
that all the amounts fixed shall
? " the maximum compensation " allowed,
the words " not to exceed " before the state
ment of each amount is surplusage, and hence
the salary of chief deputy county attorney is
not fixed by the act at the sum stated, but
may be established at any sum less than such
amount. Penwell v. Lewis, etc., County,
supra.
43. State v. McXair, 70 Ark. 65, 66 S. W.
144.
44. Phillips County v. Jackson, 85 Ark.
382. 108 S. W. 212.' deputy prosecuting at
torney filing an information under Kirby
Dig. i 6388. not entitled to a fee for con
viction, where defendant pleads guilty.
45. Iowa.— Seaton v. Polk County, 59 Iowa
626, 13 X. W. 725; Foster v. Clinton Countv,
51 Iowa 541, 2 X. Vv. 207; Tatlock t\ Louisa
County, 46 Iowa 138; Blair v. Dubuque
County, 27 Iowa 181; Davis v. Linn County,
24 Iowa 508. A county is not liable to an
attorney for his fee in representing it in a
habeas corpus proceeding, although he was
appointed by the judge in the absence of the
district attorney, where the latter had not
been notified of the proceeding as required
by law. Miller v. Buena Vista County, 68
Iowa 711, 28 X. W. 31.
Missouri. —■Kouns v. Draper, 43 Mo. 225.
Nebraska.— Sands v. Frontier Countv, 42
Xebr. 837, 60 X. W. 1017; Cuming County
v. Tate, 10 Xebr. 193, 4 X. VV. 1044.
Xcik York.— People v. Xeff, 191 X. Y. 286,
84 X. E. 63 [affirming 121 X. Y. App. Div.
44, 105 X. Y. Suppl. 559].
South Dakota.— State p. Marshall Countv,
14 S. D. 149, 84 X. W. 775.
Tennessee. — McIIenderson v. Anderson
County, 105 Tenn. 591, 59 S. W. 1016.
If a prosecuting attorney retires because he
disagrees with the court as to the manner of
conducting the case, private counsel who has
been assisting him and who continues the
prosecution under the direction of the court
does not become acting state's attorney, and
is not entitled to any compensation as such.
In re Herring, 10 Kulp (Pa.) 74.
An assistant appointed under a special act
is not entitled to the compensation provided
for assistants in counties of a certain class.
Edwards v. Allegheny County, 181 Pa. St.
216 37 Atl 337
46. Under Ala. Code (1896), g§ 5522, 5529,
providing that the solicitor's fee required to
be taxed against one convicted of crime by
section 4561 shall belong to the state where
the conviction was secured by a salaried
solicitor, and to the solicitor if secured by
solicitor pro tern., and Code (1896), p. 214,
and section 4431 et seq., providing that cer
tain bills of costs in a criminal case, includ
ing a solicitor's fee where the conviction was
secured by one not a salaried solicitor, shall
be paid by the state out of the convict funds,
if conviction is secured by a solicitor pro
tern., he is entitled to payment by the state,
out of the convict funds, of the fee taxed
against defendant by section 4561. Trapp r.
State, 120 Ala. 397, 24 So. 1001.
47. Cobb p. Scoggin, 85 Ark. 106, 107
S. W. 188. And see Contracts, 9 Cvc. 496;
Officers, 29 Cvc. 1426.
48. Banks t. 'State, 96 Ala. 41, 11 So. 469.
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3. Allowance and Collection. The fees of assistants are usually required by
law to be fixed by the court, or by the administrative board of the county.40 Under
statutes directing payment of "compensation," or "reasonable compensation,"
a decision of the board allowing an unreasonably small sum is not final, but proper
compensation may be recovered.50 Nor is an allowance made by the court con
clusive; the board may reduce it to a reasonable sum.51 However a fee fixed by
the court is at least prima facie evidence of the value of the services rendered.53
The act of the judge in certifying the amount of such fee is a judicial one which
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding for mandamus to compel payment
of the same.53 If dissatisfied with the allowance, the attorney should take an
appeal from the order granting the same." Statutory discretion to allow or disallow
fees to an assistant in certain cases, vested in a county board, is administrative
rather than judicial. The action of the board disallowing the same is not subject
to review by the courts.55 If the board refuses to act at all, the attorney may have
mandamus to compel it to act, although not in any particular way; but he cannot
recover on a quantum meruit, since his right to compensation depends wholly upon
the statute.'''1' Mandamus is also the proper remedy to compel the court or other
If the law provides a special deputy to
prosecute certain cases before magistrates, and
for a fee to be paid him on conviction, viz.,
the same fee allowed for conviction in the
circuit court, on conviction before a magis
trate and affirmance in the circuit court, both
lie and the regular state's attorney are en
titled to such fee. Goad r. State, 73 Ark.
458. 84 S. W. 638.
49. See the cases cited in the notes fol
lowing.
Excessive allowance.— Where an attorney
was appointed to act as county attorney in
a matter before the grand jury, in which the
county attorney was interested, and an indict
ment was returned, but before the trial the
order apjiointing the attorney was revoked,
and the court, in fixing the compensation for
the attorney, made an allowance to cover, not
only for the services rendered before the grand
jury, but also in the prosecution of the case,
it was held that as the attorney could not
earn compensation for prosecuting the case,
the allowance was erroneous. State t>.Miller,
132 Iowa 587. 100 X. W. 1087. And where,
under Iowa Code. § 304, authorizing the dis
trict court to appoint an attorney for the
county attorney in case of his disability, and
to fix for his services a reasonable compen
sation, the district court appointed an attor
ney to act for the county attorney in a case
before the grand jury wherein the county
attorney was under disability by reason of
interest, and also " to act as county attorney
in another matter" before the grand jury,
and then, by general order, fixed the payment
of the attorney for his services, it was held
that the order fixing the compensation was
invalid, as it must be assumed that payment
for services under the order appointing the
attorney to act in "another matter" was in
cluded. State p. Miller, supra.
Opportunity to prosecuting attorney to be
heard. — Since Towa Code, $ 304, empowering
the district court to appoint an attorney for
the county attorney in case of his disability,
and empowering the judge thereof to fix the
attorney's compensation, provides that such
compensation shall be paid out of the com
pensation allowed to the county attorney, the
court cannot fix the compensation of an attor
ney appointed to act in place of the county
attorney without giving the county attorney
an opportunity to be heard, for otherwise he
may be deprived of his property without due
process of law, in violation of Const, art. 1,
§ 9. State v. Miller, 132 Iowa 587, 109 X. \V.
1087.
50. Stone p. Marion Countv, 78 Iowa 14,
42 X. W. 570.
51. Carroll Countv p. Pollard, 17 Ind.
App. 470, 46 X. E. 1012; Commissioners r.
State, 60 Ohio St. 475, 54 X. E. 519, holding
that the compensation allowed by the court
to the assistant prosecutor under Ohio Rev.
St. § 7264, is by that section made part of
the costs; and such allowance is not con
clusive as against the board of county com
missioners, but the same may be reduced by
the board before allowance and payment, to
such sum as in its judgment is just and rea
sonable.
But if the statute directs payment of" such sum ' as the court approves, and to
them (the commissioners) seems just and
proper,' " their joint action is final. Commis
sioners r. Osborn, 46 Ohio St. 271, 20 X. E.
333; Weldv p. Hocking Countv, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)* 767, 9 Cine. L. Biil. 313.
52. Hindsdale County v. Crump, 18 Colo.
App. 59, 70 I'ae. 159; Carroll Countv v. Pol
lard. 17 Tnd. App. 470, 46 X. E. 1012.
53. People p. Xew York Bd. of Education,
26 X. Y. App. B-iv. 208, 49 X. Y. Suppl. 915;
People p. Coler. 35 Misc. (X. Y.) 454, 71
X. Y. Suppl. 127 [reversed on other grounds
in 67 X. Y. App. Div. 619, 73 X. Y. Suppl.
1144].
_
54. People r. Coler, 35 Misc. (X. Y.) 454,
71 X. Y. Suppl. 127 [reversed on other
grounds in 67 X. Y. App. Div. 61D, 73 X. Y.
Suppl. 11441.
55. Merwin p. Boulder County, 29 Colo.
169. 67 Vac. 285.
56. Merwin p. Boulder County, 29 Colo.
169, 67 Pae. 285.
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authority to make requisition on the proper officer for payment of an assistant's
legal fees.57 There can be no recovery of compensation until it has been fixed or
allowed in the mode, if any, prescribed by statute.58
4. Upon Change of Venue. Upon a new trial, held in another county to which
the cause has been removed, the trial judge cannot allow the assistant attorney a
fee for any services except those rendered in prosecuting the case before him. For
services in the court of original venue, including argument of motion for new trial
and change of venue, allowance may be made only by the judge of that court.59
The county in which the indictment was found is liable for the fees of the assistant
in the court to which the cause is removed.80
5. Assistants to United States District Attorneys.61 Assistants to the district
attorneys of the United States are paid such salary as the attorney-general may
from time to time determine as to each, which in no case shall exceed two thousand
five hundred dollars per annum.62 Special assistants to the district attorneys
shall receive such compensation only as may be allowed them by the attorney-
general, by stipulation in the appointment, or otherwise.63
PROSECUTING WITNESS.1 See Common Informer, 8 Cyc. 341; Criminal
Law, 12 Cyc. 292; Informer, 22 Cyc. 720; Private Prosecutor, ante, p. 361;
Prosecutor.
PROSECUTIO LEGIS EST GRAVIS VEXATIO; EXECUTIO LEGIS CORONAT OPUS.
A maxim meaning " Litigation is vexatious, but an execution crowns the work." 2
PROSECUTION. As applied to actions or suits generally, the following up or
carrying on of an action or suit already commenced until the remedy be attained;*
the act of conducting or waging a proceeding in court; 4 the institution and carry-
57. Merwin v. Boulder County, 29 Colo.
169, 67 Pae. 285; People v. New York Bd. of
Education, 26 N. Y. App. Div. 208, 49 N. Y.
Suppl. 915.
58. Thug under Sanborn & B. Annot. St.
Wis. § 752a, authorizing the appointment by
the court of counsel to assist the district at
torney in a criminal case, and providing that
such counsel " shall be paid in the same man
ner as is now provided by law for the pay
ment of counsel for indigent criminals " ; and
Rev. St. § 4713, providing for the payment
of counsel for indigent criminals, by the
terms of which a county is liable to pay only
such sum as the court in which the services
are performed Bhall, " by an order, to be en
tered in the minutes thereof, certify to be a
reasonable compensation," an attorney ap
pointed to assist the district attorney cannot
maintain an action against the county for
his services unless an order of court has been
entered certifying the amount of his reason
able compensation. Williams v. Dodge
County, 95 Wis. 604, 70 N, W. 821.
59. 'People v. Genesee County, 61 N. Y.
App. Div. 545, 70 N: Y. Suppl. 578, 15 N. Y.
Cr. 463 [affirmed in 168 N. Y. 640, 61 N. E.
1133].
60. Bevington v. Woodbury County, 107
Iowa 424, 78 N. W. 222; Sands v. Frontier
County, 42 Nebr. 837, 60 N. W. 1017; Fuller
v. Madison County, 33 Nebr. 422, 50 N. W.
255.
61. Expenses of assistants see supra, III,
B 2
'62. 29 TJ. S. St. at L. 181, c. 252, i 8
[U. S. Comp. St. (1901) p. 613].
63. U. S. Rev. St. (1878) § 363 [U. S.
Comp. St. (1901) p. 208]. One who is al
ready employed as an assistant district at
torney cannot recover extra compensation, as
one specially appointed by the attorney-gen
eral, for services that could not be performed
bv an officer of the department or district
attorney. U. 6. Rev. St. (1878) §§ 363-3S6
[U. S. Comp. St. (1901) pp. 208-209] ; Cole
v. U. S., 28 Ct. CI. 501. One who receives
a commission as a special assistant for par
ticular cases, or for a single term of the
court, is not an assistant within TJ. S. Rev.
St. (1878) | 365 [U. S. Comp. St. (1001)
p. 209], and he cannot recover for his services
without the certificate of the attorney-general
required by that section, viz., that such serv
ices have been actually performed, and that
they could not have been rendered by the
district attorney or his assistant or any of
the officers of the department of justice.
U. S. v. Herron, 170 TJ. S. 527, 18 S. Ct. 703,
42 L. ed. 1132; U. S. v. Crosthwaite, 168
U. S. 375, 18 S. Ct. 107, 42 L. ed. 507.
1. See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Herr,
54 111. 356.
2. Bouvier L. Diet, [citing Coke Litt
2896].
8. State v. Hardenburgh, 2 N. J. L. 355,
360.
In this sense, it is on an action or suit.
State v, Hardenburgh, 2 N. J. L. 353, 360.
Distinguished from the "bringing" of an
action see Buecker v. Carr, 60 N. J. Eq. 300,
307, 47 Atl. 34.
4. State v. Bowleg, 70 Kan. 821, 827, 79
Pac. 726, 69 L. R. A. 176.
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